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A B S T R A C T 
The primary objective of this research is to look at ways 
o~ resolving the reliability problems o~ the Cambridge Ring 
local area network system. The result is a novel design to 
enhance the Cambridge Ring with fault tolerance by 
introducing redundant communication paths with dynamic 
recon~iguration. The proposed Ring-Star system combines 
the advantages of ring and star networks to create a 
network which is topologically resilient while retaining 
the efficient communication advantage of rings. 
Although as a local area network the ring has much in its 
favour, it inherently su~~ers a major drawback 
reliability. Ring networks have by virtue of their design 
a point-to-point communication medium, and hence a single 
node failure can bring down the entire network. Likewise, 
if the transmission cable is cut, the entire network will 
fail completely. Over the years several techniques have 
been put ~orward to mitigate this problem but they have 
their limitations. A literature review was carried out to 
survey and evaluate existing fault tolerant techniques, and 
consequently to identifY key design issues. 
the analysis, and taking into account 
As a result of 
the particular 
Abstract (ii) 
properties of the Cambrid~e Ring network, the author was 
able to propose a new design. 
The design itself evolved in two stages. Phase 1 produced 
an ideal design while Phase 2 improved on the basic 
prototype by converting the configuration into one more 
suitable for practical use. 
and tested. 
Both prototypes were built 
The Ring-Star concept offers a highlY resilient system. It 
has a star-like ring structure, being a ring network 
encapsulating within its periphery a star structure. It is 
this star component which provides the high degree of fault 
tolerance to the ring - it can tolerate multiple faults. 
The design employs off-line redundancy techniques to 
provide automatic fault isolation and recovery, and it 
requires no human intervention once it is initiated. In 
essence the Ring-Star provides a non-stop communication 
facility. However as with any star structured network, 
installation may be a problem. The basic design was 
evolved into a multiple Ring-Star architecture, the 
"Hierarchical Ring-Star" to esse this problem. It also 
offers an installation more flexibility in layout and 
growth. An experimental system has been built and 
successfullY tested. From this, an estimate of cost for 
adding fault tolerance to the Cambridge Ring has been made. 
The approximate cost per node came to £60. The overall 
theoretical reliabilitY of the system has also been 
evaluated. When compared to a basic ring without fault 
Abstract ( iii) 
tolerance an improvement of about 50% was obtained while 
the overall reliabilit~ approaches 90%. 
Finall~. it should be noted that since this design is 
concerned onl~ with the ph~sical la~er configuration: it 
mav be applied to anv ring network. Thus it can be adopted 
to enhance reliabilitv for a ring designed according to the 
IEEE802.5 standard, IBM token ring or an~ other 
proprietar~ ring. 
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D E F I N I T I 0 N S A N D T E R M I N 0 L 0 G Y 
Availability 
Is the probability that a system is available to perf'orm 
its !'unctions at an instant of' time. 
Critical Faults 
Are def'ined as f'aults which disable ring operation 
completely. Thus node f'ailures and broken links are 
classif'ied as critical f'aults. 
Fault Tolerance 
Is the ability of' a system to continue to perf'orm its 
specif'ied tasks af'ter the occurrence of' f'aults. 
Link break 
Is a condition when the ring cable is severed. 
critical f'ault. 
Node Failure 
This is a 
Is the condition when a ring node f'ails in such a way as 
to disrupt ring operation by corrupting passing packets. 
Of'f-Line Redupdancy 
Redundancy wherein the alternative means of' performing the 
!'unction is inoperative until needed and is switched on 
upon f'ailure of' the primary means of' performing the 
!'unction. 
Reliability 
Is the probability that an item will perf'orm a required 
!'unction under stated condition f'or a stated period of' time. 
Definitions (viii) 
Resilience 
Ma:y be generall:y defined as the abilit:y of a s:ystem to 
survive failures in an organised manner. 
Redundanc:y 
Is defined as the addition of information, resources, or 
time be:yond what is needed for normal s:ystem operation. 
The following definitions 
Ring: 
a.re specific for the Cambridge 
Boot Server 
A device which provides bootstrapping service for various 
computers throughout the Cambridge Ring system. 
Name Server 
The Name Server pla:ys a fundamental role in the Cambridge 
Ring s:ystem. When presented with the text name of a 
service, a process or a computer, anywhere in the system, 
the name server returns the appropriate ring address. It 
is also capable of performing the converse translation. 
Repeater 
An electronic circuit that receives clock and data, 
demodulates them and presents them to the Station 
Repeater interface; modulates either the received data or 
data gated to it from the Station, and then transmits 
regenerated signals on around the ring. S:ynchronism is 
achieved using a local oscillator phase locked 
incoming clock frequency. 
to the 
Definitions ( ix) 
Station 
An electronic circuit that interfaces both to the Repeater 
and the Interface Unit of an attached device. It peforms 
serial to parallel and parallel to serial data conversion, 
controls communications across 
to the minipacket structure. 
certain error types. 
Node 
the ring by synchronising 
It detects and reports 
An electronic circuit that combines Repeater and Station 
functionality. 
Interface Unit 
Logic that interfaces a Node to a particular type of 
attached device. 
Minipacket 
The unit of transmission between Stations controlled by 
the ring access mechanism. 
Slot Structure 
A regular framing structure imposed upon the circulating 
bit stream to carry minipackets. 
Monitor 
A unique node on the ring with responsibility for 
initialising and maintaining ring operation and 
structure. 
Ring Connectors 
slot 
Fixed and free connectors for the physical connection of 
Nodes into the Ring. 
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C H A P T E R 0 N E 
I N T R 0 D U C T I 0 N 
1.1 Background 
Ring networks have a. number of desirable properties for 
applications in local area. networks (LAN). The protocol$ 
can be arranged to allow guaranteed bandwidth to all nodes 
on the ring and hence provide a deterministic response to 
user services. For real-time applications such a.s voice or 
image, this property is vital. Their point-to-point medium 
simplifies hardware, allowing rings to operate on a. wide 
range of media from twisted pairs to optical fibres. Also 
in contrast to bus networks, the transmission speed of ring 
networks is not limited by propagation time and they can 
therefore operate at much higher speeds efficiently. 
However, ring~ have one major disadvantage - reliability. 
A single failure on' its transmission path will disable the 
entire network. Thus damage to the cable at any point could 
disrupt 'ring operation and similarly nodes must operate 
reliablY at all times. 
There have been several schemes proposed to improve 
reliability. An early and obvious way is simply to run a 
--------------------
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duplicated ring in parallel. In the event of any failure 
on the primary ring, a switch is made to the duplicated 
ring. This techniQue is however far from ideal, it is too 
simplistic and can tolerate only one fault. Moreover it 
can be very expensive, approximately doubling the cost. 
Similarly, the other technigues have their advantages and 
their drawbacks. 
sought. 
1. 2 Objectives 
By analysing them, a better approach is 
The primary objective of this research project was to 
devise a scheme to improve the reliability of the Cambridge 
Ring. This objective was subject to a number of initial 
constraints. 
- First, the ensuing design should reguire minimal 
modifications to the current range of Cambridge Ring 
eguipment. Although restrictive, this helps to protect 
the present investments made in Cambridge Ring hardware. 
- Second, it is also important to take into consideration 
likel:,r future developments. Operational speed will 
almost certainl:,r improve from the present 10MHz to 100MHz 
or more. To facilitate such speeds it is likel:,r that 
optical fibres will be used as the transmission medium. 
- If the design conceived is applicable to ring networks 
other than the Cambridge Ring, it would probablY gain 
Chapter 1 3 
wider acceptance. The ideal is a general design which 
can be used with the emerging ring standards, or anv other 
new ring innovations. 
- Cost is an obvious constraint and especiall¥ so in an 
academic environment. Moreover the less expensive it is 
the more likel¥ it will find applications. 
1.3 The Need for a Reliable Cambridge Ring Sustem 
The Cambridge Ring is a tupe of ring network. Therefore it 
exhibits most of the properties of a ring network, notabl¥ 
susceptibi11tv to faults in the transmission path. However 
the current Cambridge Ring standard {CR 82) does not 
directlv address the reliabilitv problems of ring networks. 
Instead, the design philosophy attempts to reduce the 
chances of failures, and if a fault was to develop, to 
pinpoint the source quickly. 
Although the qualitv of Cambridge Ring equipment is very 
high (Spratt 80, Binn 82), continual operation of the ring 
cannot be guaranteed. There will always be an element of 
doubt. For example, a technician may cut a ring cable b¥ 
accident. This is totally unpredictable. 
The reliability of the Cambridge Ring is probably 
sufficient for University or research environments. But it 
is hardly suitable for commercial or industrial 
appplications and certainly not for military use. 
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Man;y schemes have been implemented to improve the 
reliabilit;y of rings, for example the IBM token ring has 
some fault tolerance built in, but with the Cambridge Ring, 
less has been done a Although Racal's Planet ring 
network is fault tolerant, its 
Cambridge Ring do not conform with 
implementation of 
the CR82 standard. 
the 
The 
other major suppliers of CR82 rings, Logica, SEEL and 
CAMTEC do not incorporate fault tolerance in their designs. 
This ma;y have to change. Among several surveys, a recent 
stud;y b;y the market research organisation, Frost & Sullivan 
(Financial Times, 30 October, 1985) found that the demand 
The reason for fault tolerant computers is soaring. 
cited is that businesses as diverse as banking and chemical 
manufacturers are looking to safeguard themselves against 
disaster. 
Although Frost & Sullivan surveyed computers, their 
findings should appl;y to local networks too when the;y are 
more widel;y used. Thus, if the Cambridge Ring is to be 
more widel;y accept,ed in industr;y, it should also be 
enhanced with fault tol'erance to reassure potential users. 
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1.a Research Plan 
At the inception of the project, it was decided that the 
work would be conducted in several phases. 
Phase l : To examine the literature in order to survey 
developments in fault tolerant rings, to evaluate 
them and to establish design guidelines. 
Phase 2 : To propose a suitable fault tolerant design for 
the Cambridge Ring based on the guidelines set 
Phase 3 
out in phase 1, and to develop the necessary 
concepts and techniques. 
To implement in hardware the fault tolerant 
design for experimentation and evaluation. 
1.5 Summary Chapter by chapter 
Chapter 2 is a preliminary phase providing the necessary 
background information. The historical development of 
fault tolerant computing is included to provide the reader 
with an insight into its significance. The theory and 
concepts relevant to reliability studies have also been 
presented. 
Chapter 3 describes the Cambridge Ring, paying particular 
attention to the reliability and maintainability aspects. 
Chapter 4 reviews the relevant literature to provide an 
overview in the field of fault tolerant ring networks. 
Chapter ~ 6 
Existing fault tolerant techniques are compared and 
evaluated in order to identif~ ke~ design issues. The 
result is a set of objectives drawn up to guide development 
towards a suitable fault tolerant Cambridge Ring s~stem. 
Chapter 5 forms the first stage in the development of a 
new fault tolerant ring configuration. It describes the 
proposed Ring-Star concept, the techniques adopted and 
explains the operation. However there is a limitation with 
the basic s~stem and an improved design is suggested. An 
implementation of the Hierarchical Ring-Star s~stem is 
proposed. 
Chapter 6 describes the detailed design work carried out 
to implement the Hierarchical Ring-Star s~stem. The 
protot~pe hardware is described generall~ at s~stem level 
although the unique aspects are explained in detail. 
Operational software and algorithms are covered, the 
latter including flow charts to simplif~ the explanation. 
Chapter 7 demonstrates the operation of the Hierarchical 
Ring-Star in an experimental stud~. The system was shown to 
be resilient to node failures and breaks in the ring 
cable. Furthermore it tolerates several of these faults 
without any partition problems. Manual control of the 
system was also attempted. This proved to be easilY 
configurable and in all cases, normal operation of the ring 
resumed after a short delay. 
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Chapter 8 evaluates the Hierarchical Ring-Star S¥stem. 
Its topolog¥ is evaluated in terms of cabling requirements, 
and compared with other fault tolerant approaches. The 
overall reliabilit¥ of the experimental Hierarchical 
Ring-Star is computed to gauge its improvement over a ring 
without fault tolerant enhancements. Finall¥ an estimate 
of the cost for adding fault tolerance is also provided. 
Chapter 9 discusses the merits and limitations of the 
Ring-Star concept and concludes the thesis. The research 
project is reviewed in the context of the objectives set 
out earlier in the thesis. 
C H A P T E R 
F A U L T T 0 L E R A N C E H I S T 0 R I C A L 
D E V E L 0 P M E N T S A N D C 0 N C E P T S 
2.1 Historical Developments and the Need for Fault 
Tolerance 
T W 0 
Early computers were extremely unreliable, requiring 
maintenance several times a day just to keep them 
operational. But since then, users have been demanding 
more reliable computers. This trend is reflected in the 
development of computing. 
In the early days, computers were based on vacuum tubes, 
which like lightbulbs tend to burn-out relatively quickly. 
One of these machines was built in 1946 at the Moore School 
of Engineering in Philadelphia, U.S.A. The computer known 
as ENIAC had 18000 electronic tubes, and it did operate 
over short periods of time. Maintenance engineers had to 
be present to keep replacing burnt vacuum tubes to keep it 
working. The invention of semiconductor devices changed 
all this. It was the first major step in the process of 
improving reliability. Today computers built with vlsi 
components must be thousands of times more reliable than 
the old vacuum tube machines. 
Yet, an increasing demand is evident for even higher levels 
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of reliabilit;y ( Strube 85). Computers have become so 
inte~rated into the working environment that in many 
applications downtime is not acceptable. The call is for 
"full availability from assembly to obsolescence." A 
typical example is banks. Banks were among the first to 
widely adopt fault tolerant computers since vast sums of 
money ma;y be lost if their computers are down even for a 
few hours. Another example is industrial control. In 
this application, unreliable computer operations may have 
disastrous consequences which could endanger human life. 
For these reasons the use of fault tolerant computers have 
been forecast 
future. 
to grow even more significantl;y in the 
The invention of computer networks was the next logical 
step in this process (though it must be stressed that it 
was only one of several factors leading to this 
development). It was realised that an installation could 
be vulnerable if it depended on a single computer. The 
numerous cases of major disasters involving computers and 
the loss of revenue reported b;y companies serves to 
illustrate this point. By distributin~ computin~ power to 
several computers situated physically apart this problem is 
reduced. In the earlier days of networking, computers 
tended to operate more or less in isolation with the 
occasional exchange of data. Now, distributed processing 
is favoured where one could view the entire network as one 
huge computer. Thus the focus now is on the reliability of 
the communication channels. 
--- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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There are many different interconnection schemes to connect 
together the processors of a distributed system: Star, 
Mesh, Bus and Rings. When LANs were first developed, the 
Star and Mesh topologies were rejected in favour of Bus 
and Ring topologies. The primary objectives then were 
performance and costs. For example, a fully connected 
mesh-like network would not be very flexible and 
difficult to install. They are also more complex 
is 
in 
routing and greatly increase delay in message passing. 
The development of networks appears to be mirroring that of 
computers. Initially, performance was the prime criteria 
and as technology matured, attention was switched to other 
issues - resilience being one significant factor. With the 
continuing decrease in computing cost, the extra expense of 
more reliable communication is becoming acceptable. But is 
this argument acceptable? If one is to look back at the 
development of computing, the question of reliability came 
as a consequence rather than as a result o~ planned goals. 
The transistor was not invented because it was thought the 
vacuum tube was unreliable. The integrated circuit did not 
appear because solder connections are less dependable. 
These improvements came about by normal development efforts 
in solid-state physics and were not driven by a reliability 
goal. The problem is, are we going to be .that lucky again? 
This is unlikely. Reliability must be set as a goal, not 
just a hope that it will appear as a side effect. 
Chapter 2 11 
The bulk of the potential market for LANs will be in the 
office and factorv environments. Ideallv all communication 
within an organisation; including telephonv, data, text and 
image transfer should be carried out on a single LAN 
medium. Currentlv verv few suppliers market such an 
advance product but with the present pace of research, 
there is little doubt that it will be achieved. Thus the 
whole activitv of a business mav depend on the correct 
functioning of the LAN. A catastropic failure of the LAN 
mav be tolerated onlv extremelv rarelv and then onlv for 
short intervals. Failure of a single LAN attachment mav be 
tolerated as long as the rest of the LAN continues to 
operate with no appreciable break. 
resilient. 
To improve reliabilitv, each 
The svstem must be verv 
LAN component can be 
engineered to be highlv reliable but this is no solution. 
However small the failure rate, it ~ill be multiplied bv 
hundreds or perhaps thousands of times in a large 
installation. Even on a passive bus LAN, some such failure 
will cause the network to fail completelv. Repair can be 
time consuming and disruptive to the working environment. 
It might not be acceptable for the LAN to be out of 
operation for several hours while an engineer is called. 
There£ore, if LANs are to be acceptable as the media for 
integrated communications in the factorv for example, steps 
must be taken to enhance their reliabilitv. In particular 
it must be ensured that no single failure will cause the 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chapte:t> 2 12 
LAN to b:t>eak down completely, and that all such failu:t>es 
are detected so that they can be repaired before they can 
be combined with later failures to cause a complete 
b:t>eakdown. 
In othe:t> a:t>eas, the significance of a :t>eliable LAN may be 
even mo:t>e crucial, especially if it involves human life 
such as applications in p:t>ocess ' control o:t> the nuclear
industry. Other examples whe:t>e reliable LANs a:t>e essential 
include applications in the milita:t>y, and spacebound 
satellites. In the later case, the system also has to 
function where human inte:t>vention for maintenance or :t>epair 
is impossible. Ring networks a:t>e especially vulnerable to 
reliability problems. In contrast to bus LANs, a single 
node failu:t>e could dis:t>upt the enti:t>e netwo:t>k. Ring 
components may be designed to be extremely robust to :t>educe 
this problem but there is always an unpredictable element. 
Ring cables may be accidentally severed by human e:t>ror. 
There is thus a need for reliable ring netwo:t>ks. 
2.2 Reliability 
Reliability is defined as the ability to perform a 
specified function under specific conditions for a 
specified time. Reliability can be viewed at several 
levels. In one, which is a basic network goal, is to 
p:t>ovide high reliability by having alternative sources of 
supply. This by definition is the very reason why networks 
were invented in the fi:t>st place. With unconnected 
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computers, if a machine goes down due to hardware failure, 
the users are out of luck even though there may be 
substantial computing capacity available elsewhere. With a 
network, the temporary loss of a single computer is much 
less serious because users can often be accomodated 
elsewhere until the service is restored. This is the 
computing service level. 
The level this thesis addresses is yet another level below 
the computing service level. This is the communication 
level. Here, if the node to which the computing device is 
attached to is down, the computer is unfortunately taken 
down as well. This is minor compared to the problem when 
the communication cable is severed. The whole network may 
be completely down. This is therefore a primary problem. 
For military, banking, industrial process control, and many 
other applications, a complete loss of computing power for 
even a few hours due to some catastrophe, 
otherwise is completely intolerable. 
natural or 
The computer network can prevent such failures at the 
computing service level. But reliable networks adds yet 
another dimension to the security of computer users, the 
end result is ideally a system which does not stop working. 
Reliability can be achieved in two ways. Fault avoidance 
requires the physical components and their assembly 
techniQues to be as nearly perfect as possible. The 
drawback is that the cost of obtaining near-perfect 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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components is excessive and that manual maintenance must be 
continousl¥ available because the S¥stem ceases to operate 
upon first failure. A better alternative is fault toleran-
ce. In a fault tolerant system, redundant components allow 
the S¥stem to continue to operate when some components 
fail. 
Fault tolerance involves five major issues: fault 
detection, fault location, fault diagnosis, fault isolation 
and fault recovery. 
Fault detection is the ability of a system to recognise 
that a fault has occurred. Fault location is the S¥stem's 
abilit¥ to determine where the fault has occurred. Fault 
diagnosis should uncover the type of fault so that the 
appropriate recovery procedure can be implemented. Fault 
isolaton is the process of isolating the fault and 
preventing its effects from propagating throughout a 
system. Finally, fault recovery is the system's abilit¥ to 
regain operational status in the presence of faults. 
2.3 Characterisation of Faults 
Faults may be characterised into three classes: First, 
there is the permanent fault which remains in existence 
indefinitely if no corrective actions are taken. In the 
Cambridge Ring, there are two such causes: node failure and 
link break. 
completely. 
Both these faults would disrupt ring operation 
The first failure is relatively unlikely and 
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can be controlled to a considerable extent bY good 
engineering. In ~act the range o~ Cambridge Ring equipment 
has proved to be extremely reliable (Spratt 80, Binn 82). 
The second ~ailure is likely to occur in an uncontrollable 
manner, such as when a technician accidentally cuts the 
cable. 
Second, there is the transient ~ault, which may appear and 
disappear within a very short period of time. Interference 
is one cause which results in one or more ring packets 
being destroyed. Transient faults are usually environment-
ally induced, and since they occur only occasionally, it is 
not economically worthwhile to try to prevent them. 
The third class of ~ault, the latent ~ault may be data 
dependent. Its effect appears only at certain times and 
under certain conditions, and it is really an engineering 
problem. It is similar to and will be treated as a 
transient fault. 
This thesis addresses the two permanent ~aults link 
break and node failure, and attempts to prevent them ~rom 
disrupting normal ring operation. Transient and latent 
faults are detected but nothing will be done about them 
except to report their occurrences. 
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2.4 Techniques o~ Fault Tolerance 
Fault tolerance can be de~ined as the ability o~ a system 
to continue to per~orm its speci~ied tasks a~ter the 
occurrence o~ ~aults. The key ingredient in all ~ault 
tolerance techniques is redundancy. Redundancy is simply 
the addition o~ in~ormation, resources, or time beyond what 
is needed ~or normal system operation. 
Redundancy may take several ~orms, including in~ormation, 
hardware, so~tware and time redundancy. An example o~ 
in~ormation redundancy is the error-detecting code, formed 
by the addition of information to the basic data structure. 
The redundant information allows valid and invalid codes to 
be distinguished. Perhaps the simplest form of error 
detection coding is the single-bit parity check. The idea 
behind parity is to concatenate an additional bit to every 
binary data stream so that the resulting code is forced to 
have either an odd or even number of ones. If the parity 
bit achieves an odd number of ones, it is called ''odd 
parity": if the parity bit achieves an even number of ones, 
it is called "even parity." A relatively simple check of 
the number o~ ones in the data stream allows single-bit 
errors to be detected. 
Another form of error detection coding is the checksum. 
Checksums are most applicable when blocks of data are to be 
transferred from one point to another. A simple technique 
is a "single-precision checksum," formed by adding all 
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binary data that are to be transmitted and throwing away 
any overflow. An improved variation is the 
''double-precision checksum." Assuming the number of' data 
bytes to be added is appropriately limited, overflow will 
not occur, and the information contained in the carry bits 
is not lost. Fault coverage can be substantially improved 
with the double precision approach. At the receiving 
point, the checksum is formed again and compared to the 
checksum that was generated at the transmitting point. Any 
discrepancies indicate an error during either transmission 
of' the data or regeneration of' the checksum. 
Several other error-detecting coding techniques exist, 
but they.will not be cover-ed here. The interested reader 
should refer to the wide number of' published texts on this 
subject. Parity bit checks and double precision checksum 
techniques are employed in the research work. They are 
simple, and they can be implemented in software at minimal 
cost but most of' all 
application. 
they are good enough for the 
Hardware redundancy is perhaps the most common technique 
used in fault tolerant systems. There are three forms. 
First, passive replication methods mask the occurrence of' 
faults and do not offer detection, isolation or repair of' a 
faulty module. Secondt active replication methods do not 
mask faults, but detect and locate faults so that a spare 
component can be switched in to replace the faulty 
component. Third, hybrid methods combine the attractive 
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features of both passive and active techniques. It uses 
fault masking to prevent the fault from affecting the 
system and fault detection to allow a spare module to be 
switched in to replace the faulty module, 
A common passive method of redundancy is triple modular 
redundancy(TMR). The purpose of TMR, when used in a 
passive environment is to mask single faults 
triplicating hardware and voting on the results. See Fig. 
1. The voter examines all results and generates as the 
output, what it judges to be the correct result. 
ltocU.o 
F~g. 1 Tr•p~e ModuLar Redundonc~ 
The active redundancy concept in hardware replication 
techniques attempts to incorporate fault detection and 
fault recovery into the system at the expense of 
eliminating the fault-masking capability. One example is a 
simple duplication scheme that compares the results of two 
systems and generates an error message if a disagreement 
occurs. In the event of a disagreement, the system only 
reports the error and does not recover from it. See Fig. 
2. 
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A second technique of active replication is· standby 
replacement. In this configuration, one unit is operational 
while one or more units serve as standbys, If a failure is 
detected with the on-line unit, it is removed from opera-
tion and a spare unit replaces it. This technique brings 
the system back to full operational capability after a 
single failure, but a disruption in processing is necessary 
while the spare is brought up. If this disruption in 
processing cannot be tolerated, "hot-sparing" may be used. 
In this technique, the spare operates in synchrony with the 
on-line unit and is prepared to take over at any time. 
The final active replication technique combines the 
duplication method and the standby replacement method. 
Here two units perform the same computations and a 
comparison of the results take place. In the event of a 
discrepancy between the two units, a spare is activated. 
This is also known as the ''pair-and-a-spare" technique. 
The basic concept of hybrid replication techniques is to 
combine the attractive features of passive and active 
methods to generate a system that has fault-masking, fault 
location, and fault detection as well as stand by 
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replacement capabilities. Several methods exist (Losq 76), 
but one of the most important is N-modular redundanc~ with 
spares (NMR). NMR h~brid redundanc~ uses N modules to 
create a voted output with a pool of spare resources. The 
s~stem remains in the basic NMR configuration until the 
disagreement detector determines that a faulty unit exists. 
Once identified, the fault~ unit is switched out and 
replaced with a spare, thus the reliability of the basic 
NMR s~stem is maintained as long as the spare pool remains 
unexhausted. Voting alwa~s occurs among the active units, 
masking faulta and ensuring continous error-free 
computations. 
This brief surve~ covers the broad range of techniques 
available to implement hardware redundancv. In fact the 
techniques emplo~ed in the research uses the simpler 
methods. 
hardware 
Standbv replacement techniques form the basis of 
redundanc~ to enhance reliabilit~ of the 
transmission medium. This is much less expensive when 
compared to the NMR concept but is certainly effective 
enough for the particular application. However the more 
complex techniques might be useful for the critical 
components of the Cambridge Ring s~stem the Monitor, 
Error Logger, power supplies and the Nameserver. Failure 
of any of these mav be catastrophic to the operation of the 
Cambridge Ring system. Ring nodes are however not 
The substantial cost involved is not duplicated. 
worthwhile. The~ are simpl~ isolated in the event of a 
failure to prevent them from affecting the operation of the 
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rest of the ring. 
Time redundancy can be used to detect transient error 
conditons in a system. When a fault is detected, two 
situations exist. First, a permanent fault may have 
occurred, and the correct course of action would be to 
isolate the faulty component. On the other hand, the fault 
may be transient in which case the hardware is healthy, and 
it would be a waste of resources to immediately shut down 
the processor. Time redundancy can be employed to 
distinguish between permanent and transient failure. For 
example, a timer may be set on detection of the first 
fault. If further faults are detected within a certain 
time period, then a permanent fault condition must have 
occurred, otherwise they are assumed to be transient. 
Software redundancy is simply the addition of extra 
software to provide some fault tolerant features. This 
type of redundancy ranges from a complete duplication of 
software to the addition of small programs to perform 
validity checks. These techniques are often used to 
provide protection against 
present in a system. 
software faults that may be 
One common technique is the validity or reasonableness 
check, Here additional software is added to verify that 
the results being produced are within certain ranges. 
Another type of software redundancy is the periodic 
self-test. Often, a large pecentage of faults can be 
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detected b¥ allowing software to periodical!¥ exercise the 
hardware and set a "watchdog" timer if the test is passed. 
The timer is designed to generate an error interrupt if it 
fails. A third t¥Pe of software redundanc¥ is the use of 
multiple copies of programs. To be effective, the programs 
are written b¥ separate teams to protect against the 
occurrence of common problems. The basic idea is that 
multiple programs will perform the same tasks but might use 
different methods or at least different lines of codes. 
The multiple versions run simultaneous!¥ sequential!¥. The 
results are compared to provide a means of fault detection. 
C H A P T E R T H R E E 
T H E C A M B R I D G E R I N G N E T W 0 R K, 
A D E S C R I P T I 0 N 
3.1 Basic Operation 
The Cambridge Ring S¥stem is based on the slotted ring 
principle so called because the bandwidth is divided into a 
number of fixed-sized packets or slots. 
conceptual model of a slotted ring. 
Fi~. 3 shows a 
Fig. 3 A slotted ring 
Unless the Ph¥sical distance around the ring is ver¥ large 
or there are many nodes, it is unlikel¥ that there will be 
enough dela¥ to hold several packets, so artificial dela¥s 
are needed. These can be obtained b¥ putting shift 
registers into the ring interfaces. To send a message from 
one node to another, it is necessar¥ to wait for an emPt¥ 
slot to come around, mark it as full and then load the 
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destination address and data into the slot. 
The Cambridge Ring uses a more elaborate scheme to the 
above. The structure is shown in Fig. 4. At the lowest 
level the communication ~ink comprises a closed ring of 
cable and active repeaters. The repeaters are used to 
regenerate the signals which transmit information round the 
ring. They maY also be used to connect a device to the 
network. 
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F~g. 4 Example Cambr~dge R~ng System 
The station interfaces the repeater to the interface unit 
of an attached device. This combination of repeater and 
station is known as a node. Communication takes 
place between nodes under the control of the host device. 
BasicallY. the host device calls upon the node to transmit 
and receive minipackets (m-p). The m-p is the basic unit of 
transmitted data between nodes and occupies exactly one 
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slot. Each m-p (Fi~. 5) is individuall~ addressed, 
carr~ing eight bit source and destination addresses. Two 
b~tes of data are carried to~ether with several bits of 
control information. The first bit of every m-p is the 
leader bit indicating the start of the packet. The second 
bit is the full/empty marker, used to control access to the 
slot. This is followed by the destination address, source 
address, and two data bytes. The two control bits act as 
response bits. The last bit ensures the integrity of each 
m-p. The node checks and corrects the parit~ of all 
passing m-p, and an~ errors detected are reported. 
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The current implementation of the Cambridge Ring operates 
at 10MHz. The available bandwidth is subdivided into slots 
(ie. m-p) which continously circumnavigate the ring head to 
tail separated b~ one or more gap digits. These gap digits 
act as paddin~ to permit an integral number of slots. The 
total number of m-p is constrained by the propagation dela~ 
in the cable and nodes. At 10Mhz, each 100 metres of cable 
causes a dela~ of 450 nanoseconds and so ma~ be thought of 
as storage of 4.5 bits. Each node has a delay of bits 
Each m-p requires 38 bits so a system with 12 nodes for 
example, allows a maximum of 2 m-ps with a gap of 14 bits. 
[(38x2) + 14 = 90). This itself represents a ~rest deal of 
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wasted bandwidth. 
in the Monitor can 
To improve bandwidth, a shift register 
superficially lengthen the 
ring to adjust the number of gap bits. 
central to the ring's operation, it The Monitor is 
initialises and subsequently maintains the m-p structure. 
At power on, the Monitor enters start mode and the frame 
structure is established. During start mode m-ps with the 
first two bits set are circulated, These full m-ps ensure 
that already synchronised nodes do not attempt to transmit 
until all nodes are synchronised. After ten seconds, 
assuming no error conditions exist, run mode is entered. 
The ring is now operational. 
A node wishing to transmit waits until an empty slot 
arrives; it then marks it as full, inserts the destination 
and source addresses, the data, and finally initialises the 
response bits. The transmitter may only transmit one m-p 
at a time. The transmitted m-p then goes round the ring 
to its destination where the control bits are set 
to indicate bus~, rejected, ignored, or on-the-fly 
accepted. In the latter case the data are copied into the 
destination node. 
the full/empty bit 
The m-p now returns to the source where 
is reset to zero; thus emptying the 
slot. This returned m-p is also checked with the original 
m-p transmitted to ensure 
during the transmission. 
response bits are noted, 
that no errors have occurred 
If there are no errors the 
by the m-p freed for use 
downstream nodes, and the host device informed of the m-p's 
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return. 
The response bits are used to carry flow control 
information back to the transmitter. 
Bit: ~ 
~ 
~ 
l 
l 
l 
~ 
l 
Information 
busy - the destination node acknowledges 
but has not read the m-p because the 
interface unit has not yet signalled the 
node that it has finished with a previous 
m-p. 
Accept - the destination has read the m-p. 
Not selected - the destination acknowled-
ges but has not read the m-p because its 
source selector is not set to 255 or this 
address does not exist. 
Ignored - no node acknowledged the destin-
nation address. 
Whenever a transmitter receives a response other than 
accepted, it is not allowed to transmit immediately but 
forced to wait for the ring structure to cycle around. The 
second and further unsuccessful transmission tries cause 
the transmitter to be backed off for 15 ring cycles. This 
prevents the ring being swamped with useless traffic. The 
round robin scheduling puts an upper limit on this delaY 
while the variable backoff produces a system in which 
efficiency improves under load. 
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3.2 Reliabilit¥ and Maintainability Aspects of the 
Cambridge Ring 
The designers of the Cambridge Ring system have :realised 
the potential reliability problems, and have included in 
the basic design, built-in capabilities for localising 
errors and failures. Although this is no solution, it does 
help to locate the faults Quickly and thereby enables an 
engineer to track and resolve the faults more easily. 
3.2.1 Parity checks 
First, consider the m-p structure. Every m-p includes a 
parity bit that is continously checked and maintained by 
all nodes. Each node computes the paritY of every passing 
m-p and if the generated parity does not match the old, a 
fault has occurred. This is corrected in-situ and a fault 
message is transmitted in the next empty m-p to destination 
zero. This message contains the address of the sending 
node and so indicates the section of the ring where the 
fault occurred. The fault message may itself become 
corrupted giving :rise to further valid fault messages; 
nevertheless, the indicators :reaching the Monitor will at 
least be correct for the nearest faults. The Monitor 
indicates the fault by an error count indicator and an 
error source indicator. 
-------------------------------------~- ----------
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3.2.2 Maintenance functions of the Monitor 
The m-p includes a bit, the Monitor Pass bit that is set by 
a transmitter when it fills a m-p. This bit is always 
cleared by the Monitor on passing m-p. If the Monitor 
detects a m-p that has this bit cleared but is still marked 
full, it marks the m-p empty. It is thus impossible for a 
fault to cause a m-p to become permanently full. 
The Monitor is able to detect errors which interfere with 
the permanent m-p structure and then to rapidly re-instate 
the correct structure. A large number of errors such as one 
caused by a power dip may cause the m-p structure to lose 
synchronisation. This causes the Monitor to re-initialise 
the network automatically to its original state. 
During operation, the Monitor injects random data into 
empty m-p and checks that it returns uncorrupted unless the 
m-p has been used in the meantime. Thus error checks are 
performed continously even if there is no user data on the 
network. In these ways the Monitor keeps the performance 
of the ring under continous surveillance and can give 
warning of incipient faults. 
3.2.3 Checking of returning packets 
A transmitter counts slots when a m-p is transmitted. 
Thus, a returning m-p is recognised even if its source 
address has become corrupted; the packet is then compared 
Chapter 3 30 
bit by bit with a copu of the one transmitted. If any 
discrepancy is detected, a transmission comparision error 
is reported to the interface unit. 
3.2.4 Ring breaks 
The schemes so far locates transient errors or node 
failures. They can also be used to detect ring breaks, 
providing that the repeater continues to operate with no 
signal on the ring input cables. In fact, the ring 
repeater has a phase locked loop which continues to operate 
in the centre string of zeroes, and the node is made to 
transmit a repeated fault message packet. Therefore a 
break in the cable is detected by the next active node 
downstream. 
3.2.5 Others 
Precautions are taken to reduce the probability of repeater 
failures. The part of the repeater which needs to operate 
is made as simple as possible. Power is also supplied to 
repeaters around the ring from a power supply unit, so that 
operation does not depend on power supply from the station. 
3.3 Errors and Actions Taken 
A response error, for example if a busy response is changed 
to accepted mau cause that m-p to be lost. These errors 
and others may be induced by transient errors. In this 
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case a checksum mav be used at a higher level to detect and 
correct it. Another transient induced error mav corrupt 
the addresses of the m-p. The transmitter detects this bV 
counting slots. Similarlv. data errors mav occur and this 
will be detected in the same wav. All these errors should 
cause a paritv fault to be detected at the next node which 
in turn sends a fault message to the Monitor. 
errors are recorded. 
Another class of errors is the framing error. 
Thus most 
The loss of 
the first bit of a m-p or the change of a gap digit is 
called a framing error. It causes nodes after the error 
and before the Monitor to become unsvnchronised and usuallv 
causes consequential errors. The Monitor will re-enter 
start mode until framing errors cease so that the ring is 
rapidlV resvnchronised. and svnchronised nodes are 
inhibited from using the ring until that is complete. The 
slot structure is automaticallv re-created for one complete 
cvcle and enables all the other nodes to recover. After 
128 framing errors have occurred. the Monitor re-executes 
the complete initialisation cvcle. This is particularlv 
useful if a 'burst' of framing errors occur. 
C H A P T E R 
P R E L I M I N A R Y I N V E S T I G A T I V E 
S T U D I E S 
4.1 Review of Literature 
F 0 U R 
It is a well known fact that ring networks are vulnerable 
to faults in the transmission path (Liu 84, Clark 81). Yet 
the Cambridge Ring makes no real attempt to avoid 
reliability problems (Wilkes 79, CR 82). This is not 
confined to the Cambridge Ring, in fact Moore, Geer and 
Graf (Geer 84) suggested that few if any existing networks 
could survive wide-scale disasters. They felt that most of 
the current fault tolerant networks are: 
(1) vulnerable to becoming fragmented in a hostile 
environment, 
(2) incapable of handling problems when link outages occur, 
or 
(3) incapable of ensuring message delivery in a hostile 
environment. 
Other authors made similar arg'uments to the above three 
problems. Kirk (Kirk 84) suggesting that a fault tolerant 
design must ensure: 
(1) no single failure disrupts all communication, 
------------------------------------~----- --- ---
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(2) no latent failure remains undetected and 
(3) can be extended without disrupting all communications. 
In his paper he stressed the importance of a reliable 
network stating that "if LANs are to be acceptable as a 
media for integrated communications in the office or 
factory, steps must be taken to enhance its reliability." 
Also, another serious problem he raised was that of medium 
failure, for little protection can be given against 
accidental damage to the cable and repair is likely to be 
time consuming. Kirk's third point is interesting. One 
reason for installing a LAN is the ease of expansion. To 
add a new node, the entire ring installation would have to 
be shut down before physical work could be carried out. 
Only when this has been completed can ring operation be 
restored. This procedure may take a few hours or a few 
days and during the entire period, no computing service 
would be available to users. 
inconvenient and undesirable. 
These problems have been taken 
ClearlY this is both 
a step further by Saltzer 
and Pogran (Seltzer 80) in their work at Massachusetts 
Institude of Technology (MIT). They stated that a more 
significant factor to take into account when selecting a 
network may have little to. do with the issue of the 
best technology. Instead some site-wide networks of say 
1000 computers will consider more mundane issues such as 
which technology is easiest to install, reconfigure and 
.maintain. If a basic ring is used to connect up a large 
number of nodes, a single failure might result in a 
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"Christmas tree" errect, that is, locating a burnt out bulb 
requires checking each. 
Fortunately, the effects or many faults can be reduced by 
adding rault tolerance to the basic 
following pai>.al!:raphs will present a 
ring topology. The 
brief survey of the 
current state or research in the fault tolerant ring 
network field. Section !1.2 will describe and evaluate each 
one these techniques in greater detail. 
Falconer (Falconer 8!1) suggested that a catastrophic ring 
failure will occur if a fault occurs in one or all or the 
following: 
- the node 
- the ring's central controller 
- the transmission cable 
Protection against non-catastrophic failures would in most 
applications be uneconomic. The highest risk is usually 
considered to come from node fault or cable break, and it 
here that the greatest number or options lies. 
One of the earliest solutions was the use of Bypass 
Relays (Kirk 8!1), provided at each repeater. Should any 
repeater fail, the relay associated with that repeater 
would switch it out or the ring. This technique however 
does not take into account link breaks. 
Another early design was the Dual Ring (Falconer 8!1). 
In contrast to the bypass relay approach, this method is 
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worthwhile only when the cable is the most probable source 
of failure. Should a link be severed, operation would 
continue on the spare link cable. 
made for repeater failures. 
However no provision is 
Duplication of the Ring (Weitzman 80) is perhaps an 
improved technique. In this method, the entire ring is 
duplicated so that a fault detected on the primary ring 
will cause a switch of operation to the secondary ring. 
This is unfortunately the extent of its use since another 
fault will disable the ring. Further levels of duplication 
are possible but they are economicallY unrealistic. 
Perhaps a more elegant approach 
Self-Heal ring (Zafiropilo 74). 
spare links passing all the way 
is provided bY the 
This technique uses 
around the ring with 
data transmission in the opposite direction to the normal 
links. Repeaters are able to detect when there is a break 
in the ring upstream to them, if one is detected, the 
repeater will 'loop back' i.e. take its input from the 
spare link entering it from the opposite direction. The 
repeater must then signal to the next repeater downstream 
from the break to loop back in a different way such that 
its output is sent back along the spare link. Racal's 
Planet Cambridge Ring system is an application of this 
design. 
So far the techniques reviewed are restricted in that they 
allow only a limited number of failures. The next few 
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examples presented here address this problem. 
The Hierarchical Multi-Loop S¥stem f'orces the 
partition of a network into several sub-sections. In this 
wa¥, f'aults will be isolated to the sub-loop where the¥ 
occur rather than affecting the entire installation. J • R. 
Pierce (Pierce 72) proposed a three-stage network to 
improve its reliabilit¥. 
Availabilit¥ ma¥ be f'urther enhanced b¥ mesh-like topolog¥, 
developed b¥ Haf'ner called a Braid (Hafner 76). 
Besides the ring connections, each repeater have one or 
more extra links connecting it to other repeaters. Thus, a 
signal ma¥ have a choice of several paths when the main 
ring is down. It does however require much more cabling, 
and to be ef'fective the extra links should be routed 
through separate ducts. 
network. 
It is also known as the Mesh 
The design originating f'rom MIT (Saltzer 80) reduces 
maintenance problems. The Star-shaped Ring uses the 
concept of a wire-centre, where all inter-repeater cables 
must be arranged so that the¥ alwa¥s loop back through a 
single room. It can be visualised as a flower with petals 
for every ring node. This improves maintenance since 
troubleshooting is centred in onl¥ one area. A node failure 
is isolated bY b¥passing the petal to which it is 
attached. Its main disadvantage is the great length of 
cabling required. 
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Several other techniques have been designed but they are 
variations, combinations or improvements on the 
established approaches presented here. Gridnet (Gra~ 84) 
is one such example, designed ~or a large network where 
network survival is the primary aim. The architecture 
reflects both dual loops and mesh topologies. The salient 
~eature of this network is its adaptive routing technology 
which uses distributed processing to establish alternate 
routes between pairs of nodes. Another recent design 
originating from the Marconi Research Centre (Kirk 84) has 
elements of the Star-Ring and Mesh topologies. It has been 
designed to overcome multiple faults and to ease network 
expansions. 
4.2 An Evaluation of Fault Tolerant Rings 
This section analyses a range of fault tolerant ring 
designs. Section 4.2.1 presents the evaluation criteria. 
Section 4.2.2 surveys and compares the various approaches, 
culminating in the results and conclusions presented in 
section 4.2.3. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------·--------- -----
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4.2.1 Evaluation Criteria 
Various design decisions and goals were highlighted from 
the brief review in section 4.1. They are summarised 
below. The following properties will be used as the basis 
for comparisons: 
(a) Availability 
(b) Degree of resilience (including fragmentation) 
(c) Expandability 
(d) Ease of installation 
(e) Ease of maintenance 
(f) Cost 
Reliability requirements are often expressed in terms of 
system availability: a system will be.expected-to perform 
with a certain maximum allowable time out of service during 
a particular time period. 
system availability 
Two factors are important for 
(1) how rapidly the fault can be repaired 
(2} how often the system fails 
Consider the first point. Before 
repaired, the cause must be isolated. 
the fault can be 
Unless the system is 
well designed (and documented) this can be a lengthy and 
tedious process. The second point implies that system 
failures should be kept to a minimum in the first place. 
A well designed system increases system availability 
because it is easier to maintain. Further, if system 
availability is to be increased, it must be designed to 
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provide maintenance personnel with as much diagnostic 
information as possible in the event of failure. 
The degree 
application. 
of resilience depends ver¥ much on 
Resilience is likel¥ to be 
the 
less 
significant when the network is installed in a Universit¥ 
environment where its use is less critical and users can 
tolerate occasional faults. However resilience becomes 
more critical in the factor¥ or in defense (eg. battleship) 
applications. Here lives ma¥ be endangered or vast sums of 
mone¥ ma¥ be lost due to an¥ stoppages. Perhaps it is most 
significant in situations where maintenance is almost 
impossible, such as a spacebound vehicle. The degree of 
resilience depends on the number of failures tolerated 
before the entire system is brought down. Factors such as 
fragmentation of the network and the abilit¥ of the S¥stem 
to withstand multiple failures are significant. 
Expandability is the ease with which an existing S¥stem ma¥ 
be enlarged. Ideally, when installing new nodes into the 
network, the ongoing operation of the network is not 
disrupted. In contrast, an undesirable situation arises 
when the entire S¥stem has to be shut down completel¥ for 
new nodes to be installed and tested before restoring 
network services. Non-stop operation would be preferable. 
Installing a network depends to a large extent on the 
cabling requirements. Various questions would need to be 
asked. Does it require separate cable ducts? How much 
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cabling is required? Are there anv restrictions on how 
the¥ are laid out? These are some factors which will 
affect the implementation of a network. For example, if a 
LAN is to be installed in an older building, it is unlikely 
to have cable ducts designed for todays needs. The 
building mav have been designed only for power cables. 
Although an extra cable can be accommodated, the ducts 
might not fit in more. This might rule out certain network 
topologies. Obviouslv the less cabling a topologv 
requires, the easier it is to install. Interference from 
the power cables must also be considered. This might 
necessitate the installation of a separate duct. 
Cost is naturall¥ one of the most important considerations. 
Designing reliabilitv into a system will certainl¥ incur an 
additional cost. Cost must be acceptable, although this 
must be examined in the light of the application. 
4.2.2 Description and Evaluation 
4.2.2.1 Bypass Relay 
A simple technique to allow for repeater failure is to 
provide bvpass relays at each repeater. See below. 
repeat. er 
F~g. 6 Bypass Relays 
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These relavs must be activelv held on bv each repeater to 
bring the repeater into the ring. I~ a repeater should 
malfunction, this active signal is removed causing the ring 
to bvpass that repeater. Because the bvpass relav is 
controlled directl¥ b¥ the repeater, a possibilit¥ exists 
wherebv a ~ault¥ repeater fails to switch the relav or even 
worse it mav affect the operation of the network. Also. as 
repeaters fail, arbitraril¥ long lengths o~ links without 
repeaters are found in the ring. Since a repeater drives a 
limited length of link, the performance of the ring will 
deteriorate. Its major disadvantage is that this techniQue 
is onlv confined to repeater ~ailures; link breaks will 
disable the ring. Thus it onl¥ provides a partial 
solution. However bvpass relavs are simple, cheap and easv 
to install. Also the¥ allow for multiple repeater 
failures. 
11.2.2.2 Dual Ring 
This is one of the simplest fault tolerant enhancement 
approaches'. See Fig. 7. 
nodes 
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An extra link. is laid between any two repeaters. If one of 
these links is severed, the second link is brousht into 
service. However a failure of both cables between anv two 
repeaters causes loss of service. Failure of anv repeater 
will also brins down the network. This technigue is 
worthwhile only when the cable is the most probable source 
of failure. Also, to be effective, each cable should 
follow a separate physical path, thus installation can be a 
problem. However since only the cables are duplicated, cost 
is minimal and operation is simple. 
4.2.2.3 Duplicating the Ring 
Both the bypass relav and dual rins techniques solve onlY 
one primary failure. By duplicating the complete ring 
(Fig. 8), both link break and repeater failure mav be 
rectified. The secondary ring remains in the standby mode 
until the occurrence of a fault. 
In the event of failure, operation is switched from the 
primary to the secondary ring. Because of complete 
duplication, this is an expensive approach costins 
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approximatelv twice as much. Moreover it can onlv manage 
one fault, a second fault will disable the network. For 
the same reason as with the dual ring, the second ring 
should follow a separate phvsical path. Also since the 
second ring is not completelv independent from the first, 
faultv nodes might cause unforeseen errors. 
U,2,2,4 Self-Heal Ring 
The Self-Heal ring is based on a bidirectional double ring 
structure. A standbV cable is installed alongside the main 
transmission path but is designed to support transmission 
in the opposite direction. Fig. 9A shows the self-heal 
ring. Fig. 9B illustrates its action when a link break 
occurs - repeaters on either side of the break detects the 
breakage causing them to switch relavs, in effect forming a 
loop-back to isolate the broken link. Similarlv, Fig. 9C 
shows the action taken when a faultv node is detected. 
D-
FLg. qA Self-Heal rLng 
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A major disadvantage is the potential partition problem 
when more than one fault occurs. The network will be 
divided into isolated segments (Fig. 10). This mal? be 
acceptable for a ring which does not rell? on a central 
controller, but in the case of the Cambridge Ring which 
does, only the segment which has it will continue to 
operate. The result is a severe loss of service. Another 
problem is the increased cable length under fault 
conditions. The maximum distance between any two nodes 
will be half that of a normal ring. Also, the fault 
detection and reconfiguration circuitrl>' need to be more 
complex. Finally, because of incomplete autonom~? of 
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fault-tolerant equipment from the ring (usually built into 
and controlled by the nodes), unforeseen problems may arise 
with a faulty node. An advantage is the ease of cable 
installation. The cable pair can be installed in the same 
duct without any consequence. 
1------f-, 
1------f.!" 
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F1.g. 10 Frogmentot\.on problem wnh o seLf·-heoL r•ng: two 
1.soLoted r1.ngs form when two fauLts occur 
4.2.2.5 Hierarchical Multi-Loop System 
The Hierarchical Multi-Loop system has several levels of 
interconnections. As shown in Fig. 11, there is a main 
loop where the central controller resides. Other loops are 
then attached to this main loop to which computing devices 
are connected. One example is a two-stage network, the 
Collins C-System. This consists of first-level loops 
linking ring stations. These first-level loops themselves 
are connected to a single second-level loop. Node failures 
are thus constrained to the loop concerned, and not the 
entire network. 
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,-.!±:;--Third level Interface 
Central control 
Fig. ~1 The two-stage Collins C-System 
The number of levels may be further extended. Pierce 
(Pierce 72) proposed a three stage network. The different 
levels of loops are connected by special interfaces called 
c boxes .that transfer blocks from one loop to another. 
These c boxes also supervise the routing of messages 
through the various loops to their destination. 
In general, reliability improvements obtained by increasing 
the number of stages beyond three do 
added network complexity or cost. 
not warrant the 
The obvious drawback of this approach is its complexity -
installation can be a problem. Cost is likely to be higher 
than other methods. Also if any C box should fail, then 
the entire network will be disabled. 
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4.2.2.6 Braid or Mesh Network 
The Braided network provides a substantial increase in ring 
availability. See Fig. 12. The idea is to provide higher 
reliability by introducing link redundancy, 
Extra l(..nb 
F~g. 12 Bro~d or Mesh R~ng 
The outer path is the main ring containing the nodes. Each 
node may have more than one input and/or output to allow 
for several alternative transmission paths should any 
faults develop. Thus this design allows for multiple 
faults, the maximum number depending on the level of 
braiding. However, to be effective the different paths 
should be routed in separate ducts. Thus installation and 
maintenance may be a problem. this technique 
requires much more cabling compared to some of the other 
techniques. The maximum braid length depends on the 
maximum unrepeatered cable length, reducing the maximum 
distance permissible between nodes. Another disadvantage is 
that a failure of the main cable may result in a 
functioning node being bypassed. 
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11.2.2.7 Forward Loop Backward Hop (FLBH) Network 
The FLBH network is an enhanced variation of the mesh 
network. In this class of network, each node has a forward 
link connecting to its neighbour and a backward link 
connecting to a node at some distance s, where s is called 
the skip distance. Variations of FLBH are obtained by 
choosing different values of s. In the optimal FLBH 
network, the parameter s is selected such that the diameter 
is minimized (Gerla 85), 
Elotrc~ ~'""" tu note that tho 
"'~' flow '" the ~te 
d.,.ect.Loon to thl n..ng'e 
Fig. 13 The Forward Loop Backward Hop Network 
Both forward and backward links are active, and several 
paths exist from a source to a destination. This network 
can tolerate several link and node failures, before 
becoming partitioned. It improves delay and reliability 
since the skipping of several nodes creates "short cuts." 
It has drawbacks similar to the mesh since its topology is 
really the same. 
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11.2.2.8 Star-Shaped Ring Network 
The Star-Shaped ring suggested at MIT is unique in that it 
achieves reliability by topological design rather than 
technological. Referring to Fig. 111, the entire ring is 
arranged such that inter-repeater cables always loop back 
through a single room called the wire-centre. The result 
is a ring network in the shape of a star. The bypass 
relays are activated to bypass any loop where a node fault 
or cable break is detected. 
Fig. 111 The Star-Shaped ring 
The aim of the designers was to improve maintenance and 
thus make serviceability easier, achieved through the 
wire-centre concept. This idea has the advantage of 
simplicity and the ability to tolerate any number of 
faults. However, if a link is severed, an operational node 
is bypassed. But its main disadvantage is the great length 
of cable required, and the potential installation problem 
.__ ______________________________ ----------
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with a large network. 
11.2.2.9 Gridnet 
Gridnet was designed to survive wide-scale disasters it 
overcomes problems of network fragmentation. The approach 
adopted was to develop many alternate routes for data 
transmission and by using distributed processing for route 
selection and communication control. Routing is 
accomplished independentlY of any single node or link. 
F~g. 15 Gr~dnet cons~sts of on ~nterconnect~on of loops 
The architecture is formed by interconnecting a number of 
dual loops. Each loop within the network is connected to a 
maximum of four adjacent loops by "gateway" stations. 
Gateway stations make routing decisions based on their 
knowledge of the operational status of other loops in the 
local neighbourhood. using an adaptive routing 
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technology, alternate paths can be established between 
distant pairs of nodes despite simultaneous interruptions 
to the continuity of mutiple loops. 
This approach is highly reliable, able to withstand 
numerous simultaneous faults. However the technique to 
achieve this is complex and thus expensive. Also, 
installation may be a problem with its complex topology 
which also consumes a large amount of cable. 
11.2.2.10 Others 
IBM proposed an architecture based on the star-shaped ring 
(Bux 82). Instead of one wire-centre, several are 
distributed throughout an installation. See Fig. 16. 
Physically, the ring consists of a set of interconnected 
distribution panels and lobes radiating from the panels. 
Wiring from the distribution panels to the nodes is 
star-shaped. Contained in the distribution panel are 
bypass relays used to cut inactive or malfunctioning nodes 
out of the ring. Although this configuration reduces 
cabling requirements it also removes the protection of link 
breaks between distribution panels. IBM however is working 
on techniques of routing and reconfiguration to overcome 
the link failure problem (Dixon 83). 
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F~g. 16 IBM Token R~ng Conf~gurot~on 
Another fault tolerant rin~ developed at Marconi Research 
Centre has a mesh-like topolo~y. The network consists of 
"intelli~ent" repeaters linked to~ether by an arbitrary 
mesh of links (see Fig. 17),the only constraint being on 
the number of links attached to each repeater - in practice 
three. These links are configured into a rin~ which passes 
in both directions alon~ each functional link by a 
distributed reconfiguration procedure carried out in the 
"intelli~ent" repeaters. The result is a network which can 
tolerate multiple faults. Another feature is the 
possibility of addin~ or removing links and repeaters with 
only momentary disruptions to the network operation. It 
allows flexibility in layout and expansion. 
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Fi~. 17 Two possible con~i~uration o~ the Marconi 
Research Fault Tolerant ring. 
Table l summarises the major ~eatures o~ the ~ault tolerant 
rings. 
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4.2.3 Discussion 
The survey has revealed several general points concerning 
the various design approaches. 
(1) All the designs were based on ring, star, mesh topology 
or combinations of them. 
(2) They were designed primarily to solve problems of node 
failures and/or link breaks. 
(3) The levels of fault tolerance are quite different, each 
has strengths in specific applications. 
(5) The more resilient designs have more complex topologies 
Less obvious points were 
significance of operational 
also raised. One is 
independence of the 
the 
fault 
tolerant components from the ring equipment. This prevents 
the ring equipment from causing unforeseen actions on the 
fault tolerant devices which in turn may cause uncalled 
actions. 
Ring, star and mesh topologies offer different advantages. 
Ring networks were introduced originally in part to replace 
star networks. The rationale being that a star network 
relies on a central controller and thus it is inherently 
unreliable. Also, cabling requirements of a star network 
are more substantial which in turn give rise to installs-
tion and maintenance problems. Likewise mesh type networks 
which form the topology of telecommuniation networks were 
frowned upon by LAN designers for similar reasons. 
-------- ----- -----------~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
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However those were the days when LAN technology was only 
just emerging; where technicalities and performance were 
all important. As the technology matured, other user 
oriented factors were becoming more significant. 
Installation, maintenance and reliability became more 
important factors to be considered. 
The basic reliability issues of networks were questioned. 
Although fully distributed ring LANs such as token rings do 
not rely on a central controller, they do rely on a single 
length of cable. An analogy can be drawn between this 
single transmission path and reliance on a. central 
controller. In the light of this, the basic star topology 
offers unparalleled advantages as far as the cable factor 
is concerned. Any number of cable breaks leads only to 
those nodes attached being disabled. Faulty nodes can 
similarly 
algorithms. 
be removed from the network with simple 
The present trends in fault tolerant designs can be seen to 
reflect the above argument. Increasingly. star and 
mesh-like topologies are being used to supplement a. basic 
ring structure. MIT's Star-Shaped ring, IBM's token ring 
and Gridnet are typical examples. Some designs are 
extremely resilient but correspondingly they have their 
di'awbacks. GI'idnet and Marconi Research Fault-Tolerant 
ring are examples. Their mesh-like cabling requirements 
are vei'y high while employing complex routing algorithms to 
manage communication and reliability, These complexities 
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translate to higher cost. 
4.3 Objectives for the Development of a Reliable Cambridge 
Ring 
The basic objective was to resolve the reliabilit¥ problem 
of the Cambridge Ring system. The following design goals 
were established to guide the development process. 
4.3.1 Design Goals 
(1) Fault tolerance 
The ring must not fail when a node fails or a cable 
is severed. 
(2) Degree of Resilience 
The ring must tolerate a large number of faults. 
This includes the situation when a fault has not 
been rectified before another occurs. 
(3) Reduce Fragmentation 
When there are several faults in the ring at an¥ one 
time, they should not cause partition of the 
network. This is particularly significant for the 
Cambridge Ring since it relies on a central 
controller. 
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(U) Ease o~ Installation 
The way the system is installed, in particular the 
layout o~ cables, is signi~icant. The number o~ 
cables and how they are laid depends on the network 
topology. Other questions which have to be 
considered include 
(a) Can the cables be installed in existing cable 
ducts? 
(b) Does it necessitate a ~alse floor being built? 
(5) Ease of Maintenance 
When a fault occurs, the ease of ~inding and 
repairing it quickly makes the network easier to 
maintain. Since the ring consists o~ serial active 
components, the problem when one ~ails is like 
finding the burnt-out Christmas tree light. Trouble 
shooting may require visiting each node with test 
equipment. Clearly this is undesirable. 
(6) Ease of Reconfiguration and Expansion 
In the ~uture the network will probablY undergo 
expansion. Pre~erablY this task should not cause 
too many disruptions to users of the ring. The same 
should apply to reconfiguration of the network when 
required. Facilities should be made available to 
ease the tasks. Proper documentation of the 
installation is essential. 
(7) Operational Independence 
Operation o~ the fault tolerant component should be 
independent from the ring equipment to reduce the 
probability of unforeseen interactions. 
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(8) Take into account Future Developments 
LAN technology is evolving fast, To prevent 
obsolescence the design should take into account 
future developments such as higher transmission 
speeds and the use of optical fibres. 
4.3.2 Design Constraints 
(1) Cost 
The fault tolerant enhancement cost to the ring 
should be within reasonable limits. 
(2) Minimal modifications to existing Cambridge Ring equipment 
The design should require none or minimal 
modifications to the ring equipment. 
4.3.3 Design Features 
From the objectives, 
following features. 
(1) Bypass technology 
the design should incorporate the 
Relays should be used to bypass faulty sections of 
the ring. This way faults are isolated completely 
until they are repaired and put back on-line. 
(2) Automatic operation 
Faults should be isolated without the need for human 
intervention. This way, faults are corrected in 
real time and eases maintenance by allowing the 
servicemen to re-instate the faulted system to its 
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fully operational state at a later time. 
(3) Off-line redundancy 
Off-line redundancy is a technique whereby equipment 
is initially quiescent until it is required. Mat he-
matically, this improves reliability by 23% (this 
proof can be found in many standard texts on relia-
bility, see for example Frankel 84). 
(4) Operator control 
It should be possible for an operator to control the 
system. Thus network configuration may be altered, 
for example a node may be bypassed, and removed for 
attention before replacing it back on-line. 
Likewise a section of the ring may be isolated for 
expansion. All these should be carried out without 
too many disruptions to normal ring operation. 
(5) Reporting facilities 
.Summary reports of the status of the network such as 
which nodes or links are faulty and/or bypassed are 
essential for the management of the network. This 
may help with future expansion and maintenance of the 
installation. 
C H A P T E R F I V E 
D E V E L 0 P M E N T 0 F T H E 
H I E R A R C H I C A L R I N G - S T A R S Y S T E M 
5.1 Summary 
A new fault tolerant design has been developed for the 
Cambridge Ring based on topological enhancements. It has 
been designed for a high degree of resilience, able to 
tolerate multiple faults without any significant partition 
problem. In addition, 
installation, maintenance, 
provisions are made to ease 
and expansion of the network in 
a way to facilitate non-stop operation. Installation in 
particular requires only minor modifications to the present 
range of Cambridge Ring equipment. 
The proposed Ring-Star concept has a topology which can be 
visualised as a ring with a star structure superimposed 
within it. It is this star structure, with extra links 
connecting to each node which provides fault tolerance to 
the ring. In effect, the star centre contains bypass relays 
which allow alternative paths to be switched dynamically 
according to a fault algorithm to isolate broken links or 
faulty nodes. It must be pointed out that while this is 
being carried out any ring data circulating at that moment 
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will inevitable be lost due to the relay switching 
operation. Higher level protocols should be able to 
recover any lost data. 
This basic Ring-Star concept has evolved a step further as 
a result of the acknowledged cable installation problem 
with any star-structured network. By distributing several 
Ring-Stars throughout the installation and connecting them 
up in a "star-within-a-star" topology, the advantages of 
the basic Ring-Star concept can be applied practicallY to a 
larger installation. The Hierarchical Ring-Star forms the 
final proposal as a result of this research. 
This design is not limited to the Cambridge Ring. It can be 
adapted for any other ring network, and is suitable for 
installation in buildings or clusters of buildings within a 
site. 
5.2 Introduction 
Although a wide variety of fault tolerant ring configura-
tions have been developed, few have been designed for the 
Cambridge Ring. Raca1 1 s Planet self-heal ring is one and 
there are simple implementations of the star-shaped ring 
(CAMTEC is one commercial organisation which suggest such a 
configuration to clients). 
Chapter 4 details the disadvantages of the self-heal design 
and in particular the severe partition problems with a ring 
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controlled b~ a master station. Because of its limitations 
with multiple faults, a better technique is sou~ht. The 
star-shaped ring implementation of the Cambridge Ring 
although alleviating the partition problem is deemed 
unsuitable because of likel~ installation difficulties. 
Section 5.3 describes the conceptual development of the 
Ring-Star. Technical design of the Ring-Star was carried 
out in two phases, discussed in section 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6. 
The first developed a protot~pe Ring-Star, which after 
evaluation led to the development of a second design. The 
ke~ difference is the evolution of a single unit Ring-Star 
into a multiple Ring-Star architecture. 
5.3 Conceptual Development 
Chapters 2 and 3 have provided the background information, 
in particular the technolog~ of the Cambridge Ring. Of 
relevance here is the reliabilit~ and maintanabilit~ 
aspects, the likel~ errors and the way the Cambridge Ring 
has been designed to cope with them. In brief, the 
Cambridge Ring has been designed to reduce the occurrence 
of bit errors, and when catastrophic faults occur, to 
provide information pinpointing the source quickl~. It 
makes no attempt to correct the fault. 
The literature research in chapter 4 has identified key 
design issues which resulted in a set of objectives for the 
development of a suitable resilient ring. It is restated 
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here for convenience. 
Objectives & Constraints: 
- resilient to repeater and cable faults 
- tolerate a large number of faults 
- reduce fragmentation problem 
- ease of installation. maintenance, expansion 
- operational independence 
- take into account future developments 
- cost 
- minimal modifications to existing Cambridge Ring 
equipment 
The last point needs clarification. The question of 
designing a fault tolerant s~stem to operate on existing 
equipment or instead to design an ideal s~stem even if it 
requires that existing equipment has to be re-engineered. 
The second approach is scientificall~ more exciting with 
freedom to explore new ideas without restrictions and 
perhaps come up with the ''best" design. The first approach 
however makes more commercial sense but restricts ideas 
and techniques to fit existing equipment. Considering the 
investment alread¥ made in the Cambridge Ring equipment, 
the first approach was decided upon. 
Current statistics on the reliabilit¥ of Cambridge Ring 
installations (see Binns 82 for example) indicate ver¥ 
reliable Cambridge Ring equipment. Failures ~f repeaters 
have been almost non existent, instead most major sites 
Chapter 5 65 
(Kent University and University College, London) reported 
faults with the devices connected into the ring and human 
errors such as the accidental severing of ring cables. 
There were intermittent errors but no major failures. 
Another irritation was that installations have to be shut 
down everytime routine maintenance, expansion or 
contraction of the network was required. 
Thus a suitable design should give special considerations 
to cable break problems 
facilities. In particular, 
ring, the entire installation 
down completely. 
and maintenance/expansion 
when work is required on the 
should not need to be shut 
5.4 Developing the Basic Ring-Star 
The ring topology has a very weak structure, because it has 
one and only one transmission path. Therefore, to improve 
the reliability, its topology must be enhanced. 
The approach taken was to develop first a topology to 
satisfy the primary objective of fault tolerance, then to 
add features to complete the other objectives. 
5.4.1 Topology 
The merits of ring, star and mesh topologies have been 
explored in chapter 4. Although the star network has the 
disadvantage of a central node, it does have an inherent 
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property that any device connected into it may fail without 
any consequence to the rest of the network. Similarly no 
consequential problems exist when the cable is cut. That 
is to say, the most resilient structure as far as the 
interconnection of devices is concerned is the star. 
A ring network on the other hand will fail completely with 
just a single failure but it offers performance improvemen-
ts in data communication. In contrast to star networks, the 
weak point is the transmission cable which incidentally is 
the strong point of the star. By combining the best 
features of both structures, a highly resilient topology 
will be created while retaining the efficient communication 
advantages of the ring. 
Fig. 18 shows the proposed Ring-Star topology, so named 
because a star structure is superimposed onto the ring. 
Note that this star structure is there only to enhance the 
reliability of the ring, data communication is always 
carried out in the ring until the occurrence of a fault. 
St.cr Cent-re 
F"9· 18 The Bos"c R"ng-S~or topology 
It could be argued that for the Cambridge Ring, it will 
still rely on a central controller but unfortunately this 
--------------------------------------------------------------------
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is a desi~n fact. However the basic weakness of the rin~. 
its topolo~y has now been strengthened. As far as the 
development of the topology is concerned, the central 
controller will be treated as any other device on the ring. 
The problems of the central controller will be dealt with 
later. It must be noted that for a ring which does not 
rely on a central controller such as the IBM token ring, 
the Ring-Star must be one of the most resilient structures. 
LL.nb r~ at. t.he centre 
to ~.me1e foul.t• 
F~g. 1q The star structure sot~sf•es the key obJect•ve 
of res•l~ence to mult~ple faults w~thout 
port•t~on problems 
5.~.2 Theory of Operation 
Recall that the steps necessary to achieve fault tolerance 
are fault detection, location, dia~nosis, isolation and 
finally recovery. Four major components will achieve this: 
(a) Ring nodes 
(b) Monitor station 
(c) Error Logger 
(d) Centre Switching Unit (CSU) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----· ---· 
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f~g. 20 The R~ng-Stor ~~th ~ts maJor components 
As explaineo in chapter 3, each node on the rin~ continous-
l¥ checks ever¥ passing m-p. Errors detecteo will result 
in the node sendin~ a fault messa~e to rin~ address zero. 
This message details the type of fault and the node's own 
adOress - thus fault detection and location. 
In the Cambridge Ring, both the Monitor and the Error 
Lo~ger must be set to address zero. Therefore errors 
reported by the nodes will be received b¥ the Monitor and 
the Error Logger. The Error Logger acts as a database 
storin~ all errors which have been reported. By anal¥sin~ 
the contents of the database, the Error Lo~~er can detect 
the occurrence of critical faults. For example, if any 
node in the ring should fail, the result is a stream of 
fault messages being transmitted to the Error Logger b¥ the 
next functioning node downstream. Usin~ a timer, the Error 
Logger will within a certain time period detect this as a 
critical fault - thus fault diagnosis. Note however that 
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this detection process is only partial. Although in theory 
it ought to diagnose both node ~ailures and link breaks, in 
practice link breaks might not always be success~ully 
identi~ied. A better link break detection technique will 
be described in detail in the next section. 
On diagnosing the occurrence o~ a critical ~ault, the Error 
Logger will dispatch a message to the csu. The CSU is a 
simple device being basically a microprocessor controlled 
relay circuit. It ~unctions as a switching centre 
responsible ~or directing network tra~~ic ~low through 
alternative paths. All nodes on the ring have a connection 
into the CSU. The message with the ~ault type and location 
in~ormation is processed by a ~ault algorithm. The result 
is a set o~ relay switching patterns relating the location 
of the ~ault to its position in the CSU. On activation of 
the relays, the ring fault will be bypassed by redirecting 
ring tra~fic around it - thus ~ault isolation is achieved. 
The Monitor ~unctions as the central controller in the 
Cambridge Ring system but in the Ring-Star, its role is to 
detect ring errors and in particular to resynchronise the 
ring after a ~ault has been isolated. 
been designed into the Monitor. 
These ~eatures have 
and they operate 
automatically thus network recover¥ need not be 
incorporated into the Ring-Star design. 
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;,.4.3 Link B!'eak Signal Gene!'ation and Detection 
A link b!'eak is cha!'acte!'ised b¥ the detection of a stpeam 
of pa!'ity faults from a single source. Unfortunately when 
tests were carried out, this expected pesult did not a!'ise. 
Instead the stream of errors appeared to have come from 
several sources, some of which were not even known ring 
addresses! 
This odd result contradicted statements in the Camb!'idge 
Ring 82 standards and advice was sought. After discussions 
with Dr. Andy Hopper of Cambridge University (one of the 
key designers of the original Cambridge Ring) and Dr. Steve 
WilbU!' of University College, London (whose research 
includes error logging for the Camb!'idge Ring), it was 
clea!' that the CR82 document stated an ideal situation. 
Indeed the statement would be true if every node on the 
Cambridge Ring has its own powe!' supply! The cost makes 
this highly unrealistic. If the nodes takes its power 
direct from the ring (as is the usual case), then when it 
is severed, it cannot possibly transmit the correct fault 
messages due to the power loss. This was exactly what 
happened so an alternative solution must be sought. 
The technique adopted to reliably provide a signal makes 
use of the repeater. When a link is broken the repeater 
immediately downstream generates a signal internally. This 
signal was identified and after filtering and. amplification 
was b!'ought out to connect directly into a latch in the 
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csu. A unique position in the latch correspond to a uniQue 
ring node address. Since a low level signal is generated, 
the CSU was designed to read the latch periodicall¥ to 
detect this. Thus the CSU can ascertain if a link break 
has occurred and to locate its source. See Fig. 21. This 
technique requires a small modification to the ring 
repeaters. 
Repeater 1 
011 
Repeater 2 
Other Repeotor• 
F~g. 21 A mod~f,cat,on to ollo~ the detect~on 
and locot~on of l~nk breaks 
5.4.4 Off-Line Redundanc¥ 
Pert or CSU 
.. 
" 
" 
In this concept, the system responsible for fault tolerance 
is normall¥ quiescent until the occurrence of a fault. On 
detection of a fault, it is automatically activated to 
carry out its task. 
There are two reasons for adopting this technique. First, 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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off-line redundancy improves system reliability bv up to 
23% Second, if it is not adopted there is a possibility 
that the fault tolerant device might malfunction to cause 
unwanted actions on the system it is trying to protect. 
For example, it mav switch on some bypass relays unintent-
ionally, thereby disrupting normal ring operation. 
5.~.5 Configuration Design 
Having decided on a star structured architecture, the next 
step is to design the configuration in detail. Three 
variations were conceived, illustrated in Fig. 22A, 22B, 
and 22C. Ideally any design should minimise the number of 
relays per node to reduce cost and complexity. Version A 
(Fig. 22A) requires only two relays per connection, but it 
has the disadvantage that when a link break occurs, a 
healthy node will always be bypassed as well when the link 
is isolated. . Version B was implemented in the first 
prototype of the experimental Ring-Star. Although this 
design requires less cabling, it has the same drawback as 
version A. It is possible that a perfectly operational 
node is bypassed unintentionally. This happens when more 
than one fault occurs. In Fig. 23, node 1 initially fails 
but before it can be repaired, link B is severed. Node 2 
is unintentionally isolated too. This may not at first 
hand sound too significant but what if that node happens to 
be the Monitor? Version C was adopted to avoid the problems 
of Version A and B. 
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-
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Next, the phvsical location of the relavs must be decided. 
Two alternatives are possible, either to design bvpass 
switching into the repeater logic circuit itself or to use 
external relavs. The former was rejected because it was 
realised that the repeater mav fail in such a wav as to 
affect its operation, for example, failing to-bvpass the 
repeater when it should. Recall also that one of the kev 
design objective was operational independence between the 
ring svstem and its fault tolerant component. Thus a 
decision was made to use external bvpass relavs controlled 
bV an independent device ie. CSU. 
·~g. 23 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
- ..r--1- ...--. -D I....._. 
r- Rl.ng 
<nto 
.... '-J .... 11-::' ':J I 
r ""· t 
FLg. 24 Phys"cal LmplementatLon of the reloye. 
Reloye ore located Ln the CSU 
5.5 Evolution of the Rinz-Star 
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cabte• ext.~ 
.... csu 
It was realised during the configuration design of the 
Rins-Star that there was a further problem. The concept of 
the Ring-Star may be sound but practicall~ its stal' 
structul'e can limit its applications. Cable installation 
would be a major Pl'Oblem. This section describes the 
evolution of the single Rins-Star structure into a multiple 
Ring-Star al'chitectul'e. 
Configuration of a network topolog~ depends on several 
factors: 
- architectural lavout of the installation, ie. number of 
l'ooms, flool's, buildings, and how thev are arranged, 
- the availabilitv and numbel' of cable ducts, false 
ceilinss or flOOl'B 
- tvpe of cable used eg, normal ol' flat 
- level of l'esilience l'eQUil'ed 
- cost 
The ideal is a single Rins-Star, but it is likelv to be 
~----~----------------------------------------------------------------------- ----
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suitable onl~ in small installations with a small number of 
nodes. Flat cables may be used under the carpet to connect 
nodes to the CSU across the room rather than along walls as 
is the case when normal cables are used (unless a false 
floor is installed). With a large installation, both 
methods of la~ing the cables will be unsuitable. Imagine 
maintaining an installation with hundreds of cables running 
along the walls! 
The solution to this 
distributed throughout 
problem is to use 
the installation. 
multiple CSUs 
Fig. 25 is an 
example of this technique. To prevent isolation when the 
section of ring cable between nodes of two CSUs is severed, 
the CSU-to-CSU links are added. Instead of having cables 
running across the installation, the~ are now mostl~ 
localised into groups. 
--node·---
\ 
I 
CSIJe 
csu-csu ~'""" 
F•g. 25 B~ d•str•but•ng CSUs over the •nstollot•on ths cobl•ng 
problem •s reduced 
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This arrangement is quite natural in that it reflects the 
architecture of the building. Computing equipment is 
usuall¥ located in clusters in rooms separated b¥ corridors 
or other rooms. This point is especiall¥ relevant with 
Cambridge Ring equipment. The¥ are supplied in racks, each 
holding several nodes and thus forms a natural cluster 
a~rangem.en t. Installation is therefore simpler. 
However this lavout new resembles the self-heal ring 
inheriting the disadvantage of partition problems when 
multiple faults occur. But fortunatelv, the advantage of 
clustering can be retained b¥ evolving the svstern further 
into what is called a Hierarchical Ring-Star. 
,5.6 The Hierarchical Ring-Star Architecture 
Referring to Fig. 26, it can be visualised as a 
star-within-a-star topologv arranged in levels. The first 
connects nodes to a number of CSUs. These CSUs are 
themselves connected to another level of CSU which in turn 
are linked into a central CSU. This example illustrates a 
but in practice it can have 3-level architecture 
less or more levels. This approach is an extenticn 
of the basic Ring-Star concept and it will therefore retain 
the advantages of the Ring-Star concept for a wider area 
architecture. 
~---------------------------------------------------------------- -
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Level 2 0 csu 
0 Nodes 
Fig. 26 A 3-Level Hierarchical Ring-Star Architecture 
The central CSU serves to coordinate the other csus. thus 
they are called 
respectively. 
the Master CSU and the Slave CSU 
Although cable management is reduced. with a much larger 
installation it can still be a problem. To further reduce 
cabling requirements, more levels can be added. This can 
be achieved by arranging the topology to fit into the 
architecture of the building or site. In general, one 
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level is allocated to the room, the second to a floor, a 
third to a building and the fourth to connect between 
buildings within a site. The number of levels should be 
selected on the basis of the total number of nodes, how 
the¥ are grouped, and the spread between them. This 
approach is highl¥ structured and modular, using the basic 
Ring-Star topolog¥ as a building block to construct large 
networks. 
C H A P T E R S I X 
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6.1 Introduction 
This section discusses the practical design details made. 
The hardware, software, algorithms, and operation of the 
Hierarchical Ring-Star system are described. 
Hardware was kept simple by designing the circuits around a 
microprocessor, supported with standard ssi, msi and lsi 
components. The first prototype was wire-wrapped but the 
final design was produced on printed circuit boards. 
Two different circuit boards were required : the Master CSU 
(MCSU) and the Slave CSU (SCSU). They are similar in design 
but for a different configuration of relays. 
Section 6.2 describes the MCSU-SCSU interconnection scheme 
in the Hierarchical Ring-Star structure. A description of 
the MCSU is covered in section 6.3 followed by that of the 
SCSU in section 6.4 and the Error Logger in section 6.5. 
Section 6.6 has details of the Node Dictionary, a central 
concept in the design. Finally, operation of the 
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Hierarchical Ring-Star is explained in section 6.7 to 
complete the chapter. 
algorithms employed in 
Section 6.7 also includes the 
the design, paying particular 
attention to the ~ault algorithm. 
6.2 MCSU-SCSU Interconnections 
The SCSUs are connected to the MCSU in a star structure, 
similar to the way ring nodes are connected to the SCSU. In 
general, the Hierarchical Ring-Star can have any number o~ 
levels, dictated by the architecture of the installation. 
But to illustrate the interconnection scheme, a simple 
2-level architecture will su~fice. See Fig. 27A. The 
original idea was to use a single link between the MCSU and 
the SCSU as shown in the diagram but this has a serious 
drawback. A situation may arise whereby a per~ectly 
operational SCSU is bypassed, for example when the ring 
cables on either side o~ that SCSU are broken as shown in 
Fig. 27B. Several nodes on the ring will be isolated as a 
result a ~orm o~ partition problem. To satis~y the 
objective o~ minimal partition, a modification is made 
by adding a second link as illustrated in Fig. 28. 
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F~g. 21A A s~mple MCSU-SCSU lnterconnectLon Scheme 
FLg. 218 PortLtLon problem WLth the SLmple MCSU-SCSU 
lnterconnectLon Scheme 
The number of rela¥s required in the MCSU are doubled but 
the second pair of cable is more significant. Rin~~: cables 
are not cheap and since the SCSU ma¥ be Ph¥sically placed a 
fair distance from the MCSU, this may add quite 
substantiall¥ to the overall cost. So the question is, ''Is 
this partition problem in practice reallY that critical?" 
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This can onlv be answered in the context of an application. 
However for the experimental svstem, the ideal model shown 
in fig. 28 was designed. 
F~g. 28 Improved Interconnect~on Scheme to prevent 
Port~t~on Probleme 
It was also decided that a 2-level architecture be adopted 
for two reasons. Firstly, this project on completion will 
be adopted for the Cambridge Ring installation in the 
department of Electronics Engineering. Secondly, a 2-level 
architecture is the minimum Hierarchical Ring-Star 
configuration possible and therefor~ the cost is minimised. 
Most of the ring nodes in the department are situated in 
several rooms within a single floor of the building. If a 
SCSU is allocated to each room, thev can in turn be 
connected to the MCSU within the same floor. Thus a 
2-level architecture suffices. Also, although most rooms 
have only one or two nodes, a 4-node SCSU was decided upon. 
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The spares are there for future uses. For the same 
reason, the MCSU has been designed with 8 relay ports. 
6.3 The Master Centre Switching Unit (MCSU) 
6.3.1 Introduction 
The MCSU functions as the central controller of the 
Hierarchical Ring-Star system. Conceptually, it is 
positioned in the middle of the installation responsible 
for controlling the network structure. It does this by 
coordinating SCSUs to alter the ring's transmission path. 
The MCSU is also responsible for storing information 
concerning the installation by maintaining a database 
called the Node Dictionary. The term dictionary is used 
because it holds complete details of every segment of the 
ring. For example, it knows if a particular node or link 
has been bypassed or not, and whether it is faulty. This 
Node Dictionary is dynamicallY maintained to reflect the 
real-time status of the network. 
6.3.2 Basic hardware 
The MCSU was designed as a conventional microcomputer to 
which was added extra circuitry required to control bypass 
relays. The block diagram is shown in Fig. 29. The 
detailed circuitry can be found in appendix 3. 
ZIOA 
CPU 
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'Wake-up' 
C•rcu,try - Tx 
Fig. 29 Block diagram o~ the MCSU 
The unit consists o~ a Zilog Z-80A microprocessor, 8 
kilobytes of EPROM, 8 kilobytes o~ static RAM, three serial 
input/output portatogether with the necessary supporting 
circuitry. This configuration provides the means to 
control an array o~ relays, arranged to support eight relay 
ports. Each relay port connects a single SCSU into the 
system. 
6.3.3 Relay con~iguration 
Each relay port (RP) consists o~ two relays connected back 
to back, shown!in Fig, 30 in the off position. 
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The rel 011' ere .mo.m 
"" the\..-. HORI1Al post.t'-008' 
F~g. 30 Relay conf~gurat~on of a Relay Port ~n the MCSU 
When the MCSU is ~irst powered up, an algorithm configures 
the relays so that i~ a RP is not connected to a SCSU, it 
is le~t in its normal position. This is because an~ unused 
RP must provide a through path in case a signal travels 
between two SCSU separated b~ one or more unused RPs. Fig. 
31 should ~urther clari~~ this. 
I I I I I I 
--- 11CSU-5CSU connector-• 
' I' ' v 'r"' ' v , ' ' " 
I I I I lnlOod RelOIJ Port I I 
t-------------·-·---1 
~'"'~ 'RPj,_,~ RP J! ! ··········-~ CO~ 
"-..rel: OM/ relJ. OFF to pro""de o 01.~ poth 
/ 
' 
ll:SU 
F~g. 31 Phys~cal ~mplementat~on of the H~erarch~cal R~ng-Star 
-----·---·---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chapter 6 86 
6.3.4 Communication channels 
Two serial input/output ports are provided bV a Zilog Z80A 
SIO; one for communicating with the Error Logger and the 
other with a terminal. It is through the terminal that an 
operator can manipulate the MCSU either for configuration 
control or for status information. The Error Logger 
channel is required for passing fault messages between the 
Error Logger and the MCSU. An Intel 8251A provides a third 
serial port for communication with the eight scsus. Note 
that instead of having 8 serial ports (one for each SCSU), 
onlv one was implemented to reduce cost. All the SCSUs are 
wired onto the same multidrop line and bV using time 
multiplexing together with protocol techniques, messages 
can be exchanged reliably. This is satisfactory because 
communication between the SCSU and the MCSU is infrequent 
and short. It is onlv required when faults are detected or 
when operator controlled configuration of the system is 
required. The phvsical connections are illustrated Fig. 32. 
---------·--· ------------------------------------------------------------------------
rx ~ ,/ ----------------,-------~---
' ,, 
',, 
,, 
,, 
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SCSU1 
scsuz 
',, ,,_...__, 
', rx 
tx 
F~g. 32 Mult"drop L"ne techn"que adopted for 
MCSU-SCSU Commun"cat"on 
6.3.5 Basic tasks 
SCSU n 
When the MCSU receives a message which requires switching 
operation (eg. fault message receivea from the Error 
Logger), a relay pattern generation algorithm is 
executea. The resulting relay switching pattern activates 
the appropriate relays to accomplish the task. 
The relay pattern generation algorithm, ana the MCSU 
control software are containea in the EPROM while the RAM 
provides buffer space and workspace for the microprocessor. 
Also stored within the static RAM is the Node Dictionary. 
The Node Dictionary is a file which stores all data 
relating to the status of all the nodes, links, and SCSUs 
in the network. More significantly it records the node's 
ring address-to-relay port relationship and the scsu•s 
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address-to-relay port relationship so that it knows .which 
relay port to activate in order to isolate a faulty node, 
for example. This information is fed into the MCSU when 
the system is first installed, after which it is dynamical-
ly maintained. 
Since the MCSU is usually inactive, a battery has been 
added to the static RAM to retain the contents for ten 
years. This is required to implement off-line redundancy. 
6.3.6 Off-line redundancy 
To implement off-line redundancy, the "wake-up" concept is 
adopted.· Put simply, the normally quiescent device is 
activated bl/' a "wake-up" signal when its operation is 
required. Two "wake-up" circuits are employed; one used to 
activate the MCSU itself while the other is used by the 
MCSU to activate SCSUs. 
The MCSU can be activated by three sources: 
(a) The operator 
The operator is expected to set up the system initially 
and when required, to control the network ie. reconfig-
uration. summary reports of the current network status 
may also be requested. 
"wake" the MCSU up. 
(b) The Error Logger 
A manual switch is provided to 
When node failures are detected bY the Error Logger a 
message must be sent to the MCSU for corrective 
- ------------·-------------------------------------------------------------------------
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actions. Before this message is dispatched, a 
"wake-up" si~nal must be sent ahead to activate the 
MCSU. 
(c) The SCSU 
Link breaks are detected b~ the SCSU. Once corrected, 
a message must be sent to the MCSU for logging. Again 
a "wake-up" signal must precede the messag;e. 
The following circuit achieves the task. 
To PCS 
+!;U 
rad .. e 
r-
I 
ON AF . 
rotOOJ 
~. H-
"' ..
~% f' --· \lake-up /_ .. 
' 
- On,orr 
+SU 
1 
from SCSU 
(If f' fro:~~ Errcr. 
l.oWf<" 
0\1 ty~ o-
ON 
FLg. 33 "Wake-up• CLrcuLt. All Lnputs to the AND gate ere normcll~ 
hLgh. A lo~ on en~ Lnput cctLvctes the MCSU 
The "wal<e-up" signal is generated b;y an AND gate. Normall;y 
the output of the AND gate is high. When an operator 
requires the service of the MCSU, the manual switch 
provided is set on. This forces the output of the AND gate 
low generating the "wake-up" signal. This signal next 
drives a rela~ driver to switch on the rela;y completing a 
circuit to provide the MCSU with power. Similarl;v the 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Error Logger achieves the same effect b~ driving a low 
signal into the AND gate. Note that the logic has been so 
designed that if an~ one of the inputs is accidentall~ cut, 
the MCSU is automaticall~ activated. 
When required, the MCSU can activate an~ one or more of the 
scsus. For example, to b~pass a node attached to a 
particular scsu, onl~ that SCSU needs to be operational. 
The rest are not required and thus left in their quiescent 
state. Again a simple high/low signal is enough. A latch 
functions as a parallel interface to suppl~ the "wake-up" 
signal. Under the control of the microprocessor, an~ 
pattern may be sent to the latch to activate the selected 
scsu. Once activated, it remains in that state until reset 
b~ a complementar~ pattern. 
DO 
D1 
D2 
DJ 
D4 
D5 
DG 
D1 
I 
~t.ed to tr...croprooesS'Cr doto bus 
SCSU1 
SCSU2 
SCSUJ 
SCSU4 
scsus 
SCSUG 
SCSU1 
scsus 
Tr01"18111.t •w-ake-up• SL.~ 
FLg. 34 ·~eke-up• CLrcuLtry - Trcnsmct, The Latch LS normaLLy 
Ln•tLClLsed to bLncry 1. When any SCSU LS to be 
'woken up', a 0 LS wrLtten Lnto the latch 
correspondLng to that bLt. eg, Lf SCSU2 LS requLred, 
the pattern sent to the Latch LS bcnary 10111111 
----· ----- -------------------------------------------------------
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6.4 The Slave Centre Switching Unit {SCSU) 
6.4.~ Basic hardware 
The hardware is similar to the MCSU. With the exception o~ 
the relay con~iguration, the SCSU is really a sirnpli~ied 
MCSU. It has been devolved into a peripheral device 
largely controlled by the MCSU, thus slave CSU. 
The circuitry di~~ers ~rem that o~ the MCSU by having only 
one serial port, less memory and a latch which detects link 
breaks. The block diagram is shown below. Appendix 4 has 
the detailed circuit. 
I Ctock ) Z80A 
CPU 
( ~·~ake-up' I ~ Cl.rcur..try ... Rx . 
I 'Wake-<Jp' I 
: C&.rcattt~ - Tx . 
EPROH 
U.nl; 81"'eol; 
SIWI De'ect ~eh 
FLg. 35 BLock 0Lagram of the SLave CSU 
The serial port communicates with the MCSU, passing ~ault 
messages and receiving switching commands. The link break 
latch records the status o~ the links attached to nodes 
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to which the SCSU is connected. By reading this latch 
periodically, the SCSU can detect a broken link. 
6.4.2 Relay configuration 
Each repeater has three relays to control ring signal path. 
Two are on either side of the repeater. Their design are 
discussed first. 
Consider the relaY positions in Fig. 36. 
repeater 
0 ~ 0 
0 0 
F~g. 36 Relo~ conf~gurotLon 
IdeallY, each relay should be able to switch in three ways 
thus: 
o---o 
0 
The reasons are illustrated in Fig. 38A, Fig. 38B and Fig. 
38C. 
MCJII 
...,_... / 
--J)........,::!I-!1--~8>-{c::J--i! ... ) 
aa-----o 
F~g. 38A Normal pos~C~on 
of relays 
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F~g. 388 PoG~t~on of relays 
when bypass~ng a 
faulty repeater 
broken Lt.nk 
---J)........,JI..!I.-
0 
.... e,_,~~-"'--~)"-'_( ____ o~~ e 
0 
.Q: ) 
F~g. 38C PoG~t~an of relays when bypass•ng a broken l~nk 
However no such rela¥ exists. A three position rela¥ can 
be implemented but it requires two rela¥S. This is 
uneconomic considering the number of such rela¥s required 
and moreover, it can be avoided. Consider a section of the 
Ring-Star structure in perspective. It can be shown that 
position B can be left out by adding a third relay (instead 
of four if 3-position relays are adopted). Rela¥ position 
A is a must since this is the initial and normal position 
for ring signals when no faults exist. This is also the 
normal position of the relay when no power is applied to 
the rela¥s. 
Chapter 6 94 
G---1--•w; 
' 
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' 
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' 
'----······························-················································' 
By observing Fig. 40A and Fig. 40B, relay position B is 
altogether not reQuired. 
FOIA.ty 
Repeat Of" 
Ropoote~ 
"'"' l 
Repeater 
~~'---f-1--<Y ·················-------~- .................. ...1 ~ Dl.Ver"81.Cin of Rl..ng 8\.~8 to bypoee 
fc>A.ty repeater 
FLg. 40A ConfLgurotLon to bypass a faulty repeater 
Hvered cobl.e 
repeater,.. ......... ,\ \/ 
··········'7":!....--<:t-""L~__jf"""!<>._ Ot-1 ---\-\----'--<0 
rei. Oil" 
;·-. ./ 
D..veref.on or ~ng 
___ 8\..gnol.s to buPo-• 
f16V8r'ed Cl1ll.• 
... \, 
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. ' ~' .... ,.,./ 
'-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
F~g. 408 Conf~gurot~on to byposs o severed cobLe 
This configuration therefore requires three relays for 
every node. The next Question is, "Where are the relays 
physically located?" To realise another objective which 
requires that existing Cambridge Ring equipment can be used 
with minimal modification, the configuration shown in Fig. 
39 is unacceptable. It requires relays to be built into 
the repeaters itself. To avoid this, the relays are 
designed into the SCSU with connectors linking them to the 
ring and the repeaters as illustrated in Fig. 41. 
scsu o~~ou<no """ 
or the row Rel.C\1 Ports 
J-----------~--------------., 
: 
: 
<;-------------- .... -------- ~ 
FLg. 41 PhysLco~ LmpLementotLon of the SCSU 
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'lepeatorP 
In a normal ring implementation, connectors are used to 
link each repeater into the ring. Now, instead o~ that, 
connectors from the ring and repeaters are brought into the 
SCSU where the link is then made through the relays, On 
the SCSU this is called a relay port. 
6.1.3 Basic ·Tasks 
The SCSU has two major tasks: 
(a} to detect link breaks 
(b) to accept and execute switching commands received from 
the MCSU 
When either of the above two tasks are required, the SCSU 
is activated from its normally quiescent state bY a 
"wake-up'' circuit. This circuit is controlled by two 
sources; the MCSU and the node. 
________ _..! 
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When a link break occurs, the "wake-up" circuit will detect 
a high to low transition transmitted from the repeater 
which diagnosed the break. This switches power into the 
SCSU, "waking" it up. The SCSU can ascertain where the 
cable is broken b~ the ver~ same signal. These signals are 
also fed into a latch. B~ scanning this latch the scsu can 
determine the location of the break. This has been 
explained in detailed under the section "Link break signal 
generation and detection." Two alternative actions are 
next carried out depending on where the break is. The 
break ma~ occur on a normal link or an edge link. These 
two t~pes of links are shown below: 
Non-edge L'nk Edge L'nk Non-edge L'nk ,_, 
c "•· L.t.nl:: between I ""~~ 2 scsu. , 
L j_ 
scsu 1 scsu 2 
~--····· 
!__ __________________________ _ 
FL.g, 42 To "lLuetrote the two typee of t.c..nU. Edge Lt.nb ere L.t..nb wi'Y..oh 
CO!"''MMt two nodes eeporated bcal two SCSU.. Nor-D. or- Non-edge L.1..nf::e connect 
nodes W!..tf'l..n one SCSU. 
---------------------------------------------------
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If it is a normal link, it is immediately isolated as 
illustrated in Fig. 43. 
HYered l..1.nk Repeater• 
~~~~~oo~n~-·c~~~~-----L-~ ____ •'_nk~~C-----~~----~"'~:r~ 
[~~ ~~J. 
scsu 1 scsu 2 
Luum 
'--'-------------·---------------
F•Q· 43 lsolotLng o non-edge ltnk requLres octLon or only 1 SCSU 
A message is then sent to inform the MCSU of the fault. 
The Node Dictionarv will be updated to reflect the new 
status. Again a "wake-up" signal must precede this message 
to activate the MCSU. 
If it is an edge link, no switching action will be carried 
out, Instead a message will be sent to the MCSU. It 
awaits the return message which will contain the necessarv 
commands to isolate the fault. The reason is that in this 
case, the actions of two SCSUs are required. The MCSU is 
responsible for coordinating this task. 
- - - ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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scsu 1 scsu 2 
11CSU 
'-------------------------------····················· 
F~g. 44 lsolat~ng an edge-LLnk requLres the actLcns of 2 SCSUs 
and the MCSU 
The second type of task originates from the MCSU itself. 
It may be an operator's command to bypass a node or a link. 
Likewise it could be the corresponding reset commands. 
Operator commands allow the ring configuration to be 
altered. Typical examples are when maintenance or 
expansion are required. 
In both cases, the SCSU will remain in the active state 
until the occurrence of another stimuli. If the links have 
been physicallY repaired, the MCSU can be instructed to 
de-activate the pai>ticular SCSU by removing the "wake-up" 
signal. It will then I>eturn to its quiescent state. 
Finally, each SCSU has a unique address, set up (on an 
8-wa¥ switch) during installation. This is important since 
it identifies the SCSU which is communicating with the 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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MCSU. Recall that a single communication channel is shared 
between all SCSUs. 
6.5 Error Logger 
The primary function of the Error Logger is to log ring 
err-ors. It forms part of the Hierarchical Ring-Star system 
responsible for fault detection. 
The Error Logger is an active device connected directlY 
into the ring, and is positioned immediately upstream of 
the Monitor. Since all error messages are sent to ring 
address zero, the Error Logger must be installed with that 
address to receive them. 
It has four main task's: 
(a) monitor the ring for e~rors, to log them and their 
sources 
(b) keep track of erro~ occu~rences 
(c) inform the MCSU when node faults are detected 
(d) provide summary report of ring errors 
Before describing the tasks 
conditions are presented. 
6.5.1 Ring Errors 
above. all possible error 
The following errors are caused by faulty nodes, faulty 
ring cables or intermittent noise induced faults. 
(a) Empty -
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a packet has been received by the Monitor with 
an illegal leader sequence. This could lead to 
an empty chain error. This type of packet is 
deleted by the Monitor. 
(b) Parity - The parity of a packet 
incorrect. 
entering a node was 
(c) 0 to 1 - On checking a returned unused packet which was 
filled with data it is found that a bit which 
was transmitted as a zero has changed to a one. 
(d) 1 to 0 - On checking a returned unused packet which was 
filled with data it is found that a bit which 
was transmitted as a one has changed to a zero. 
(e) 2nd time full - Indicates that a full packet is making 
its second pass through the Monitor. When a 
full packet enters the Monitor, the "Monitor 
passed" bit is cleared. Therefore, if that 
packet re-enters the Monitor with that bit 
uncleared, an error has occurred. 
(f) Lost leader - Indicates that the ''Start of packet" bit 
is not 1. This is a framing error and may 
cause the ring to lose synchronisation. 
(g) One in gap - The gap should be an ''all zero'' sequence. 
If not, this causes a framing error. 
All the above errors cause error messages to be sent to 
ring address zero. 
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6.5.2 Hardwa:t>e 
The Error Logger is based on a standard Z80 Small Server, 
with two serial ports added. 
In total, there are three ports. One interfaces into the 
Cambridge Ring through a node, allowing ring packets to be 
read or written to. Fault m~ssages sent bV ring nodes are 
received through this port. The second port provides a 
serial link for communication with the MCSU. The third 
connects a terminal to the Error Logger allowing commands 
to be entered by an operator or error information to be 
displayed. 
6,5,3 Functions of the Error Logger 
Since the Error Logger is set to addressed zero, it 
automaticallY monitors the ring for errors. These are 
logged together with their source in a file. Thus a 
dvnamic record of the ring's error status is maintained. 
Each type of fault and their occurrence rate are recorded. 
In particular, it tr·acks 
if any single source causes 
period Y, a critical fault 
the occurrence frequency so that 
X number of errors over a time 
has occurred. Note that it 
does not distinguish between the different tvpes of errors 
as long as thev originate from the same source. A message 
will be sent to inform the MCSU. From this information, the 
MCSU is expected to b;ypass the fault. In the 
------------------------------------- -
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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experimental svstem, X is set to 20 and Y set to 1 second. 
Critical faults are recorded in the file to~ether with the 
other errors. If reQuired, the Error Lo~ger may be issued 
a command to print out an error report. This is simply a 
summarv of all errors recorded with their freQuency and 
soux-ce. 
6.5.4 Fault Message Packet Format 
Fault messages are transmitted on the first passing empty 
packet with the following format. 
ruE. 
1 - 3 
4 - ll 
12 - 19 
20 
- 27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 - 37 
38 
Description 
set to one 
bit address set to 0 
address of error source 
error count 
one in gap error 
lost leader error 
2nd time full error 
l to 0 error 
0 to 1 error 
parity error 
empty error 
fault packet received 
set to one 
determined by fault message packet parity 
----------------------------------------------------------------
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6.5.5 Error Logger to MCSU Communication Protocol 
A simple protocol is employed for communication with the 
MCSU. Since messages are short (a few b~tes), an as~nchro-
nous transmission technique is adopted with the following 
characteristics eight bits, odd parit~. one start bit, 
and one stop bit. 
Messages are exchanged in blocks with the following format: 
Code ror Node F(U.t c..•~ 11H 
ReLay Por< nuober 
Checr..o,.d, B~e 1 (Lob! 
Checkword, B~e 2 1Mb! 
F~g. 45 Message Format for Error Logger to HCSU Commun~cat~on 
The first b~te contains the fault code ie. 11H for node 
fault, followed b~ the Rela~ Port number of the node which 
detected the fault. The checkword ensures error-free 
exchange of messages. Normall~ checksums are used in such 
transmission protocols but in this case of short 2-b~te 
messages, the~ are not. Instead the checkword duplicates 
the message completel~. The receiver checks this against 
the original message and accepts it as correct if the~ 
match. This technique reduces the chances of undetected 
bit errors. An acknowledgement is then returned to the 
sender. If the message received is erroneous, it is simpl~ 
rejected. The sender is not informed of this but instead 
is expected to detect the problem. 
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On transmission o~ a messa~e. the sender sets a watchdog 
timer. I~ an acknowled~ement is not received within the 
time period set, it automaticall~ re-transmit the same 
messa~e .. A total o~ ten re-transmissions are allowed, 
a~ter which the task is abandoned. A "transmission ~ailed" 
message is then sent to the operator's terminal. Fig. 116 
illustrates the protocol in two ~low charts. 
Start 
I 
Transmit 
Wake-Up signal 
I 
Transmit 
Message Block 
I 
Set Watchdog 
Timer ON 
I 
End Transmission 
------ --------------------------------------------------
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Watchdo~ Timer Interrupt 
Reset Watchdog Timer 
y N 
How many retransmission attemted? 
r-------------------Y 
N 
Communication Failure Retransmit Message 
Inform Operator Set Watchdog Timer ON 
Acknowledgement management . 
Fig. 46 Error Logger - MCSU communication protocol. 
6.5.6 Other Facilities 
The terminal linked into the Error Logger provides an 
operator with error information as follows: 
(a) as ring errors are detected, 
displayed on the terminal. 
they are immediately 
(b) a summary error report can be reQuested through the 
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menu d~iven user inte~face (entering cont~ol A on the 
ke¥board) and choosing the "Print Error Information " 
option. 
6.6 The Node Dictionar¥ 
The Node Pictionar¥ is central to the operation of 
the Hierarchical Ring-Star. It is a database containin~ 
configuration information relatin~ to the architecture of 
the installation as follows: 
- the node's ring addresses 
- scsu_ add~essee 
- status 
- address-to-rela¥ po~t relationships 
The last class of information is the most important. It 
allows fault messages received from the E~ror Logger 
and SCSU {containin~ the type of fault with the 
corresponding address of the node which detected them) to 
be translated into the correspondin~ relQ¥ set on the 
scsu. Only then can the faulty component be isolated. This 
information must be entered into the Node Dictionary when 
the system is first installed; 
Nodes, SCSU addresses and status information are all eight 
bit binar¥ quantities stored in a st~ict sequence in the 
file to reflect the address-to-relay port relationship. 
-------------------------------------- -- -- ----- -- ----'-~ 
fbb«o or \. .... .c.. or csu 
SCSU ~. ottOCllwd to fl' t 
St.atUI" of scsu t 
Node Adci"H• ottaehtd to RP 1 
Sl.atut of RP 1 
Node Addt-H• attaehtd to RP 2 
$t.OLUf at RP 2 
NoM Add-M• ott.ocNd to RP 3 
St.CitUf of RP 3 
Node Add!-.. , CJt.toctwd to RP 4 
StatUI Of' RP ' 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
SCSlf AddrNs Gttoct.d to RP 8 
Statut of SCSU 8 
Node Addr-e•• attoehed to RP 1 
St.Cl.w ot RP 1 
Hoda Ackt-.. , Clttoched to RP 2 
Ste~.u. or RP 2 
Nodt Ati-••• attoohed to RP 3 
St..at.ut 01' RP 3 
Node Met-e•• attoc:t.d to RP ' 
Stotut of RP 4 
l 
lnf 
on 
~l.«l r«.ou.ng to 111t RP 
<ho ICSU 
6 .,... ..... or RP 
I nf~\.Dn r.l.Cit1.rtg to l.Oii RP 
<ho IICSU on 
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J F~g. 41 Node D~ct~onary F~le Structure 
The first field, "number of levels of CSU" inclicates the 
total number of levels in the Hierarchical Ring-Star 
installation, in this case, two. 
The rest of the file is clivided into records, each relatin~ 
to one relay port of the MCSU, The address ancl status of 
the SCSU attached to this port are recordecl into the first 
field. The status field stores the followin~ flags: 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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S7 S6 S5 S4 S3 S2 S1 S~ nu = not used 
nu nu nu nu 
0 empty ie. no SCSU attached 
1 ent~y 
0 normal 
1 : ~elay port/SCSU bypassed 
0 4 relay po~ts 
1 8 ~elay po~ts 
0 node ent~y 
1 SCSU entry 
Note that if any of the relay po~ts does not have a SCSU 
attached, an entry ~ still be made. Status bit S0 
reflects this. Sl indicates whether the relay po~t (or 
SCSU if one is attached) has been bypassed or not. Bits S6 
and S7 a~e the~e only to aid the Node Dictiona~y searching 
algo~ithms. An "8 relay ports" field implies that it is 
within a MCSU record. Otherwise, it is within a SCSU 
record. A "node entry" field implies the ~ela;y po~t has a 
node attached while a "SCSU entry'' implies a SCSU attached 
to the relay port. 
The next four fields in turn stores info~mation relating to 
the feu~ relav po~ts of the SCSU - add~esses of nodes and 
thei~ status. The status field stores the following flags: 
S7 S6 S5 S~ S3 S2 S1 S0 
nu nu 
-
• 
'----
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nu = not used 
0 empt;y ie. no node attached 
1 : entr;y 
0 node operational 
1 nod faul tll 
0 link operational 
1 link broken 
0 normal 
1 rela;y port/node b;ypassed 
0 normal 
1 link bypassed 
0 node entry 
1 scsu entry 
Bit S0 indicates whether the relall port has a node entry 
or not and whether it has been bypassed in Sl. Likewise 
the status of links attached to the node is contained in 
S4. The condition of the node and the link attached to it 
are shown in S3 and S2 respectively. S7 is there to speed 
up algorithms used for searching the Node Dictionar;y. 
During the operation of the Hierarchical Ring-Star, the 
-------------------------------------- - - - - - - - -
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contents of the Node Dictionary may change as the system 
changes state. For example, more ring nodes may be added 
into the network. Likewise, as faults occur, the relevant 
status fields alters accordingly. These are carried out 
dynamically. 
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6.7 Ope~ation of the Hie~a~chical Ring-Sta~ 
6.7.~ Int~oduction 
Ope~ational tasks of the majo~ components of the 
Hie~a~chical Ring-Sta~ have been desc~ibed in the sections 
preceding this. This section se~ves to put them togethe~ 
in a coherent fo~m to P~esent the complete operation of the 
system. 
The MCSU is cent~al to the ope~ation of the Hie~archical 
Ring-Sta~. responsible fo~ cont~olling and coordinating the 
entire installation. In tu~n. the MCSU depends critically 
on the Node Dictiona~v to provide it with the necessa~v 
information. This information is dynamic, changing when 
and as faults occu~ o~ as the configu~ation alte~s. Node 
failu~es and b~eaks in ~ing cables are ~epo~ted by the 
Erro~ Logger and SCSUs respectively. 
In cont~ast to node failures, link b~eaks are usually 
~esolved in-situ bv the SCSUs ~esponsible for detecting 
them. Node failure messages on the othe~ hand must first 
be p~ocessed by a fault algo~ithm in the MCSU. Onlv then 
will a set of suitable relav switching patterns be issued 
to the ~elevant SCSUs to isolate the faultv node. 
Simila~ly, an operator mav ~equest for a particular node or 
section of ring to be bypassed, and subsequentlv to be 
~eset. In this case, both the node and the link will have 
to go through an algorithm in the MCSU in o~de~ to generate 
the approp~iate switching patte~ns. 
--··----------------~----------------------------------------------------------------------
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In the latter case, a user interface is provided to ease 
the interactive process necessary with the MCSU. 
6.7.2 User Interface 
A menu driven user interface allows an operator access to 
facilities provided to control the Hierarchical Ring-Star. 
The menu driven techniQue has been implemented because 
it offers an uninitiated user one of the easiest means to 
use the system. A set of commands is presented on the 
terminal display from which a user can select a choice. 
Whenever data entry is required, 
to enter them. 
the user will be prompted 
The system provides the following functions: 
(a) Set up Node Dictionary 
(b) Display system status 
(c) Bypass node 
(d) Bypass relay port 
(e) Bypass link 
(f) Bypass SCSU 
(g) Reconnect node 
(h) Reconnect relay port 
(i) Reconnect link 
(j) Reconect SCSU 
(k) De-activate SCSU 
(1) Disable Error Logger 
(m) Enable Error Logger 
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When the svstem is first installed, data must be entered 
into the Node Dictionarv bv invoking the Set up Node 
Dictionar¥ command. This has been explained in section 
6.6. Suffice to sav that addressing information is 
entered. 
To see wh~t have been entered, the DisPlS¥ svstem status 
command will displav contents of the Node Dictionarv in a 
suitable decoded form. If alterations are required, the 
Set up Node Dictionar¥ command must again be invoked and 
the entire procedure repeated. Editing facilities are 
limited. No alterations can be made to the file after 
coming out of the command. However once complete, the Node 
Dictionarv will be dvnamicallv maintained, either as faults 
occur or when an operator reconfigures the svstem. 
Reconfiguration of the network structure is usuallV carried 
out when expansion or maintenance is required. Commands 
(c) to (m) have been designed for this purpose. For 
example a node mav need to be removed for testing. Bv 
entering the B¥pass node command, the svstem will request 
for the node's ring address to be input. Once done, and 
after receiving an acknowledgement, the node can be removed 
without disrupting the ongoing ring operaton. When that 
node has been returned to the ring, a Reconnect 
command will put it back into operation. Likewise, 
node 
anv 
link or SCSU can be removed and then reconnected bv 
selecting the appropriate commands from the menu. 
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For ring expansion, the Bypass link command is normally 
used to isolate the section of the ring where the extension 
is reQuired. Once acknowledged that this has been carried 
out, the isolated link can be cut and extended. When 
completed the new section can be brought into operation by 
issuing the Reconnect link command. 
Bypass relay port is a command allowing any relay port on 
the system to be isolated from the ring. This mav either 
be in the MCSU or in any SCSU. In the case of the SCSU, 
the relav port may have a node attached or it may not. In 
fact this command was designed to support the latter, and 
particularly to facilitate the addition of a new node to 
the ring. Recall that unused relay ports have a loopback 
plug attached to provide a path for active ring signal. So 
to add a new node, this path must be isolated first. Once 
done. the command Reconnect relay port is issued to bring 
the node into operation. In a similar way, Bypass SCSU 
and Reconnect SCSU allows a new SCSU to be installed. 
De-activate SCSU command has been implemented to support 
the off-line redundancy technique adopted. When a SCSU is 
activated to "repair" a fault, it is left in that state 
even after the fault have been physically rectified and the 
Reconnect command issued. To comply with the off-line 
redundancy technique, that SCSU must now be de-activated, 
The De-activate SCSU command accomplishes this. 
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In all cases, disruptions to normal ring operation are 
minimal and should only result in a momentary loss of 
service. Thus all the commands can be carried out while 
the ring is in active operation. 
A guide for operating the Hierarchical Ring-Star system can 
be found in Appendix 2. By going through and explaining 
every item on all the menus, a user is shown, 
example, the entire operation of the system. 
6.7.3 Operation 
The basic tasks of the system have been described in the 
previous section. To support them, several underlying 
operations are next described. 
is: 
(a) receive and decode commands 
The sequence of operation 
(b) search the Node Dictionary and update its status 
(c) compile a list of switching commands 
(d) coordinate and control the distribution of tasks 
(e) inform the operator (via the terminal) of the tasks 
carried out 
(f) send a message to the Error Logger to update the fault 
file 
Command codes may be received from three sources: the Error 
Logger, SCSU and the system operator's terminal. 
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The operator interacts with the MCSU via the terminal, 
entering commands to carru out various tasks. Node fault 
messages are received from the Error Logger while the SCSU 
sends the MCSU link break informaton. Messages received 
from the SCSU will contain both the relau port number and 
its own address. The Error Logger will supplu the node's 
ring address, while the user interface prompts the operator 
to supplu all the necessaru addressing information for anu 
particular command. 
From the information received, the MCSU searches the Node 
Dictionaru. The Node Dictionaru acts as a road map for the 
MCSU recording the entire network configuration. Once the 
node, link or SCSU have been located, status flags are 
updated and depending on this and the status of 
neighbouring entries, a list of switching actions are 
compiled. The reason for this is that some faults mau 
require the nodes next to them to switch in tandem in order 
that theu mau be bupassed. For example, if node (n) is 
reported fault¥ and node (n+1) is found to be previouslu 
faultu (and thus bupassed), then the switching operation 
must divert ring signals between node (n-1) and 
instead of (n+1). 
The next step is to distribute the switching tasks. 
(n+2) 
Some 
tasks are centred on a single SCSU alone but taking the 
examp1e above, if node (n-1) reside in a different SCSU 
from that of node (n), then obviouslu two different sets of 
switching tasks are required for two SCSUs. 
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Protocol are employed to distribute the tasks reliably. 
Switching actions are contained in what is called a CSU 
Switching Block (CB). It encapsulates the complete list of 
switching commands. These are sent to and received by the 
relevant SCSU for immediate action. 
On successful completion. the operator is informed by a 
message displayed on the terminal. Likewise the Error 
Logger is informed so that its error file may be updated. 
In all cases, if any switching commands are not carried 
out, the status flags are reverted to their original state. 
This usually refers to the situation when the communicaton 
protocol fails to deliver a CB successfully. 
All the above techniques employed will be discussed in 
detail in the following sections. 
6.7.11 Codes 
These codes are the common language used by the various 
units within the Hierarchical Ring-Star for communication. 
They are divided into four classes, some are command codes 
while the rest are informative. Command codes are issued 
by the MCSU to the SCSU requesting switching actions. 
Information codes are issued by the MCSU, SCSU and Error 
Logger for passing information between them. 
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(a) MCSU to SCSU 
Commands codes 
Command Code (in hexadecimal) 
Bypass node 11 
Reconnect node 21 
Bypass link 12 
Reconnect link 22 " 
Switch left relay 13 
Reset left relay 23 l{ 
Switch right relay 14 
Reset right relay 24 J, 
Switch centre relay 15 
Reset centre relay 25 D( 
'0 
These codes directly manipulate relays in the SCSU. Relays 
are organised into relay ports, each consisting of' three 
relays. Fig. 48 illustrates this: note the left, right and 
centre relays. 
Fig. 48 Relay Port 
Bypass node command causes a particular ring node to be 
bypassed. Bypass link command does the same t'or a 
section of' the ring. Likewise, the rest of' the commands 
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manipulate each relay in a relay port. The Reconnect or 
Reset command switches the relays back to its normal 
reset state. Takin~ an example, a node reported fault¥ 
will initiall¥ be bvpassed and removed. When it has been 
returned repaired, 
into operation. 
the reset command will brin~ it back 
(b) SCSU to MCSU 
Information codes 
Information Code (in hexadecimal) 
Link break (bvpassed) 31 
Link break (not repaired) 32 
These codes inform the MCSU of link breaks. The first code 
indicates to the MCSU that the broken link has been 
bvpassed so the MCSU merelv needs to update the Node 
Dictionarv. The second code informs the MCSU that it has 
not been repaired so the MCSU is expected to issue command 
codes back to the SCSU for the necessarv corrective actions 
as well. 
The reason for the two codes is that not all links are 
under the control of anv one SCSU. If a link break occurs 
between two SCSU, then onl¥ one will detect it but both are 
required to switch to~ether to isolate the link. Since 
SCSU operations are all independent of each other, the onlv 
way is to let the MCSU control the situation. 
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(c) Error Logger to MCSU 
Informst~on codes 
Information 
Node fault 
Code (in hexadecimal) 
11 
When the Error Logger detects node faults on the ring, 
these codes convey the information. 
corrective actions. 
The MCSU will take 
(d) MCSU to Error Logger 
Command codes 
Command Code (in hexadecimal) 
Disable error detection process 52 
Enable error detection process 53 
During the period when relays are switched, momentary 
breaks in the ring cable will occur. 
may rece~ve false error messages. 
Thus the Error Logger 
The f~rst code ~nforms 
the Error Logger of the ~mpending act~on, so that error 
messages are simply ignored till the second code re-enables 
it. These codes are used, for example, when the operator 
requests the MCSU to isolate a node. 
Informat~on code 
Information 
Link break occurred 
Code (in hexadecimal) 
51 
This code informs the Error Logger of a l~nk break so that 
it can update its error file. 
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it can update its error ~ile. 
6.7.5 Action Blocks 
The codes themselves will only in~orm the recipient o~ 
commands or in~ormation. Without addressing information, 
the~ will be useless. Thus the codes are usuall~ never 
sent on its own but are, instead, embedded into an Action 
Block. 
An Action Block is a two byte block containing both a code 
and an address. The address may be a rel~ port number or 
a ring node address. These locate switching operations to 
a particular location in the ring. 
Code 
Relay Port number 
Code 
ALng Node address 
ActLon BLock format for 
MCSU-to-SCSU messages 
ActLon BLock format for 
MCSU-to-Error Logger messages 
The only exception is when the MCSU in~orms the Error 
Logger to switch on or o~f its error detection process 
this requires only a single byte. 
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6.7.6 CSU B~ock (CB) 
At a higher ~eve~ is the concept o~ CSU Block (CB). 
Depending on whether the receiver is the SCSU or the MSCU, 
each CB holds the necessary in~ormation either required ~or 
a single SCSU ~or all its switching tasks, or ~or the MCSU. 
Act~on BLock 1 
Act~on Block 2 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
Act~on Block n 
F~g. 50 Sw~tch~ng Block Formot 
As shown above, the CB is essentially made up o~ Action 
B~ocks. Each Action Block is responsible for a single 
operation. Depending on the task, the CB mav contain one 
or more Action Blocks. 
6.7.7 MCSU-SCSU Communication Protocol 
A communication protocol is employed to pass CBs between 
the MCSU and SCSU. Although the protocol is kept as simple 
as possible, it employs techniques to ensure reliable 
communication. 
The simplicity originates ~rom hardware design decisions. 
First, the transmit and receive channels are physically 
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separated onto two cables so that there can be no collision 
between transmissions. 
scsu 1 
scsu 2 
scsu 8 
F~g. 51A The HCSU-to-SCSU 
commun~cat~on ~e 
one to many 
scsu 1 
scsu 2 
scsu 8 
F~g. 518 The SCSU-to-HCSU 
commun~cat~on ~s 
many to one 
As far as transmission of CB between the MCSU to SCSU is 
concerned. no collision is possible. But the converse is 
unfortunately true when the transmission is from the SCSU 
to MCSU. It was deemed uneconomic to provide a separate 
channel for each SCSU. 
The decision taKen to implement such a simple technique was 
based on the small number of SCSU involved and the very 
different nature of system operation. Complex protocol 
techniques such as CSMA/CD and tokens are justified for 
networks with a large number of nodes. The overheads are 
not justified tor a small number of nodes i.e. scsus. 
Also, the application is different. In a computer network, 
throughput on the channel can be very high but in the 
Hierarchical Ring-Star, the channels are not even used 
except when faults are detected and rectified. Also, the 
only possibility for collision is when multiple faults 
occur simultaneously. This is not very likely but the 
protocol employed takes this into account nevertheless. 
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The communication packet structure and the receiving 
process is first discussed followed by protocol techniques 
and finally the transmitting process. 
Start of pocket (SOP) 
OestLnotLon SCSU Address 
Source SCSU Address 
CTRL FLeLd 
CSU BLock 
End of pocket <EOPl 
Checksum FLg. 52 Pocket structure 
SOP and EOP serves to synchronise the transmission 
processes. If a collision occurs, part of one packet may 
be destroyed. The receiving process may as a result accept 
the second packet as part of the first. SOP prevents this. 
The receiving process always search for the SOP and when 
found, resets itself to read in the rest of the packet. An 
earlier packet even if it has not been completely received 
will be immediately discarded. 
discover this by timing out. 
The sender will eventually 
A watchdog timer is set on 
transmission and is reset only when an acknowledgement is 
received. If it is not received within a time period, a 
re-transmission is initiated. 
The packet is read byte by byte till it detects the EOP 
which signals the end of the packet. The receiving process 
will then read in the Checksum field. As the bytes are 
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read, a double precision checksum is continuosl~ computed. 
When complete, this checksum value is compared to the value 
given in the Checksum field. If the~ match, the packet is 
assumed to be received correctl~. 
packet is then returned to the sender. 
An Acknowledgement 
If the checksums do 
not match, transmission error is assumed and the packet is 
discarded. The sender will not be informed, but instead 
expected to re-transmit the same packet when its watchdog 
timer times out. Note that the same protocol is emplo~ed 
for the MCSU-SCSU communication as for the MCSU-Error Logger 
communication. 
Assuming the packet is received correct!~, the receiver 
will next process the addressing field. This is different 
for the MCSU and the SCSU. In the case of the SCSU, the 
receiving process compares the Destination Address field to 
its own address. If it matches, the CB is meant for this 
SCSU and is then forwarded to the next process which will 
execute the Action Blocks enclosed. If it does not match, 
the CB is simpl~ discarded. The Source Address provides 
the receiver with the sender's address for the 
Acknowledgement packet. 
In the case of the MCSU, the Destination Address field is 
obvious!~ irrelevant since it is always zero. The Source 
Address field is more important since replies must be sent 
to the proper sender. 
In all cases, when a packet is read~ for transmission, a 
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"wake-up" signal is fi~st sent to activate the destination 
csu. Afte~ a sho~t delay the packet is dispatched, setting 
on a watchdog time~ simultaneously. If an acknowledgement 
is ~eceived befo~e the time expi~es, the t~ansmission is 
deemed successful. Othe~wise, a ~e-t~ansmission is 
initiated. A total of ten t~ansmissions is allowed befo~e 
the whole p~ocedu~e is abandoned. A message will then be 
displayed on the te~minal to indicate this. 
In some instances, tor example, when a link b~eak occu~s 
between two SCSU, two CBs have to be sent to each of them. 
To accommodate this possibility, a one bit sliding window 
p~otocol has been implemented fo~ acknowledgement 
management. This uses a stop-and-wait method, since the 
sende~ t~ansmit a packet and then waits fo~ the 
acknowledgement befo~e sending the next. 
synch~onise the communication p~ocess. 
This helps to 
Summa~ising the p~otocol, the t~ansmitting p~ocess : 
{a) encapsulates the CB with the SOP, Sou~ce and Destination 
add~ess, EOP and Checksum to fo~m a packet 
{b) sends a "wake-up" signal to the destination 
{c) t~ansmit the packet afte~ a sho~t delay 
{d) set on the watchdog time~ 
{e) waits fo~ an acknowledgement 
{f) if acknowledgement is ~eceived, t~ansmission is complete 
(g) othe~wise, a ~e-t~ansmission is initiated 
{h) if ten t~ansmissions have been attempted without success, 
the t~ansmission is abandoned. 
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(i) a message is displayed - in the case of the MCSU a 
message is displayed on the operator's terminal. The 
SCSU will display the pattern 11110000 on the array of 
light emitting diodes (1=off, 0=on). 
And, the receiving process : 
(a) searches for the SOP; if found 
(b) read in the rest of the packet, otherwise continues 
searching 
(c) while reading the packet, it simultaneously looks for the 
EOP and sums all bytes 
(d) when EOP is found, the Checksum field is extracted and 
compared to the internally generated value 
(e) if they match, the packet is deemed successfully received 
(f) and an acknowledgement is returned to the sender 
(g) if they do not match, the packet is ignored 
6.7.8 Relay Pattern Generation Algorithms 
These algorithms produce a set of relay switching patterns 
according to the type of fault or task required. The 
algorithms view the entire relay configuration completely 
when generating the switching patterns. It sees the 
network configuration represented in the Node Dictionary. 
Thus the algorithms can be superficially compared to a 
situation of "navigating through the map of the system." 
The contents of the switching patterns depends directly on 
the status of the system. 
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Depending on the situation, one of the following algorithms 
are employed: 
(a.) Link bypass 
(b) Link reset 
(c) Node bypass 
(d) Node reset 
(e) scsu bypass 
(f) scsu reset 
Faulty nodes or links are bypassed according to 
algorithms (c) and (a) respectively. Likewise, commands 
can be issued to bypass nodes, links or SCSU and to reset 
them. Since the switching actions required for commands to 
bypass nodes or links are similar to actions required for 
isolating faults, the algorithms are equally applicable. 
Also, edge and non-edge cases are handled in the same way. 
The algorithms are described by using flowcharts. The 
following conventions are used 
Refer to Fig. 53, 
The normal position of the two state relay is its initial 
state. 
Switch to 0 implies switching to the other position. 
Switch to 1 implies switching back to the normal position. 
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Subcripts refer to the relative position of relays on each 
relay port. 
( )l is to the left 
( )2 is to the right 
( )3 is the centre relay 
ropoatoro 
!!:!/ ""'n n+1 n+Z 
___ l 2 1 I 2 , I 2 1 j'_ _, / 
• b3 3 3 3 
F~g. 53 Convent~ons used. Reloys shown ~n the~r NORMAL pos~t~ons 
Either, the nth relay port is the port where the faulty 
node is attached to or it is the relay port whose ring node 
reported a link break. 
The positions of other relay ports are relative to the nth 
rela;.r port. 
(n+l),(n+2), etc refers to relay ports to the right of this 
rela;.r port. 
(n-l). (n-2), etc refers to relay ports to the left of this 
relay port. 
In both cases, the larger the number the further it is from 
the reference relay port, n. 
All algorithms are based on an analysis of conditions on 
either side of the item to be bypassed. 
RP = Relay Port 
6.7.8.1 Node/RP BYPASS algorithm 
I Node/RP to be b;vpassed I 
I Analysis on LEFT of RP J 
<eft RP> N 
b;vpassed? 
y 
switch (n)l. to 1 
switch (n)3 to l2l 
switch (n-1.)2 to 1 
switch 
switch 
switch 
switch 
switch 
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(n)1 to 1 
(n)2 to 1 
(n)3 to l2l 
(n-1)2 to l2l 
(n-1)3 to 1. 
,:' igh t RP'>---'"-----i 
bypassed? 
switch (n+1.)1 to 0 
switch (n+1)3 to 1 
y 
switch (n)2 to 1 
switch (n+1)1. to 1 
END Fig. 54 
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6.7.8.2 Node/RP RESET algorithm 
Node/RP to be reset 
Anal:;sis on LEFT of' RP 
eh switch (n)1 to 1 N switch (n)3 to 1 
b:;passed'? switch (n-1)2 to 1 
switch (n-1)3 to 1 
y 
switch (n)1 to 0 
switch (n)3 to 1 
I 
I 
Anal:;sis on RIGHT of' RP 
rig~ N switch (n+1)1 to 1 
< (n+1)3 b:;passed. switch to 1 
y 
switch (n)2 to 0 
switch (n+1)1 to 1 
( END Fig. 55 
6.7.8.3 Link BYPASS algorithm 
Link to be bypassed 
on 
side of' link 
b:,rpassed'?/ 
N 
switch (n)1 to 0 
switch (n-1)2 to 0 
END 
y 
6.7.8.U Link RESET algorithm 
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Do nothing since the link would 
have been previously bypassed 
Fig. 56 
Link to be reset (reconnected) 
on 
side of' link 
/ b:,rpassed'? 
N 
switch (n)1 to 1 
switch (n-1)2 to 1 
y Do nothing since the link would 
have been previously bypassed 
Fig. 57 
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6.7.8.5 SCSU BYPASS algorithm 
More conventions have to be introduced to explain this 
algorithm. 
Referring to Fig. 58, 
The first RP on any scsu is the first RP immediately 
downstream between two SCSUs. 
The last RP on any scsu 
~
is the first RP immediately 
upstrJam between two scsus. 
Relay ml is the left relay on the MCSU: Relay m2 is 
the right relay on the MCSU 
F~g. 58 Convent~one 
SCSU to be bvpassed 
Switch ml to 0 
Switch m2 to 0 
Analvsis on LEFT of SCSU 
y 
N 
switch (last RP)2 to 0 
Analvsis on RIGHT of SCSU 
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Do nothing 
.r 1 gh t 1 i n~k:.__.::!.Y~----1-:---:-:-=--~ 
bv~d? Do nothing 
N 
switch (fi~st RP)l to 0 
END Fig. 59 
6.7.8.6 SCSU RESET algorithm 
SCSU to be reset 
Switch m1 to 1 
Switch m2 to 1 
Anal¥sis on LEFT of SCSU 
l I 
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left link Y Do nothing 
'b:y pas sed ?,>---....:...-----{_.:_::_:::.:.:;.:.:.::.:::.J 
N 
y Do nothing 
N 
switch (first RP)1 to 1 
END Fig. 60 
6.7.8.7 Unique Cases 
So far the algorithms have ignored repeater faults. The 
Cambridge Ring fault detection technique is based on a 
node, made up of a repeater and an access logic. It is the 
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access logic which detects faults. The repeater by itself 
does not have the capability to detect faults •. 
In any installation, it is likely for a ring to include 
several repeaters without any access logic cards. These 
repeaters will not detect faults but will instead propagate 
them downstream to the next repeater or node. If this is 
a node, there should be no problem. The fault will be 
detected and the faulty repeater isolated correctly. But 
if it is another repeater, the fault will be passed on to 
the next unit downstream. However if this unit is a node, 
the node bypass algorithm will incorrectly isolate the 
second repeater leaving the faulty repeater in the ring. 
Therefore the algorithm will fail if there are more than 
one repeater between any two nodes in the ring. This 
problem can be solved by adding an additional watchdog 
algorithm on top of the basic fault algorithm. The rule 
is: "If fault messages from the same source continue to 
be received after corrective action has been carried out. 
the next upstream relay port should be bypassed. This is 
recursively executed until no more faults are detected." 
An example will clarifY this algorithm. Fig. 61A shows a 
section of a ring with two repeaters between two nodes. 
r~er1 
FI-g. 61A 
r---., 
• • . .
• • 
• • . . 
. . 
'----"" 
node 2 
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re node 1 eails, the eault will propagate through the two 
repeaters to be detected by node 2. Consequently, repeater 
2 will be bypassed and at the same time error messages will 
continue to be received by node 2. The watchdog algorithm 
will next bypass repeater 1 and einallv node 1. 
Next refer to Fig. 61B and consider what happens ie the 
loopback plug LP1 is accidentally removed. Node 1 sees a 
link break, but again a false one. The link break 
algorithm will wrongly isolate link L while node 1 
continues detecting a link break. 
F~g. 618 
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Now, consider the case when there are several loopback 
plugs in use, and LP1 is removed unintentional!~. 
FLg. S1C 
These two examples can be solved b~ appl~ing the watchdog 
algorithm. 
The same algorithm can again be applied to solve the 
problem of a broken node-to-SCSU cable. Refer to Fig. 
610. If the connection between node 2 and the SCSU is 
used, sa~ to isolate the link between node 2 and 3, and is 
then severed, node 3 will detect a link break signal. The 
watchdog algorithm will b~pass node 2 to b~pass the break. 
nodes 
---:/ M-ng Nvered node-to-SCSU c~e 
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However if, instead of a broken node-to-SCSU cable, the 
SCSU-to-MCSU cable is broken, then the watchdog algorithm 
will fail. 
F~g. 61E 
To bypass link L in this case will require SCSU2 to be 
isolated. The watchdog algorithm have been modified to 
detect and solve this. 
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Faults continue to be detected even 
after executing a b;ypass algorithm 
I 
I 
Isolate the next upstream rela;y port 
Have all rela;y ports on the SCSU 
been bypassed? 
Yes? y 
1 Isolate the scsu 1 
N 
An;y more fault messages received? I 
N 
I End I Fig. 62 
~--------------------------------------------------------------------- ------
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Installation Procedure 
The connections between the different units are made as 
follows. The cable which normally links a repeater into 
the ring must be redirected into one of the D type 
connector (marked "To Ring") of a Relay Port on the SCSU. 
The second of the D type connector (marked "To Repeater") 
must be connected into the D type connector on the 
repeater. This procedure is carried for all the repeaters 
on the ring. All Relay Ports must be connected up. Thus 
if a RP is not actuallY connected into the ring 
(spare RP on SCSU), a loop back plug must be used. Each of 
the SCSU must then be connected into the MCSU by means of 
the MCSU-SCSU cable. Details of the interconnection scheme 
and cabling information can be found in Appendix 5. 
All SCSUs and ring nodes must have unique addresses, chosen 
between the range 01H to 0FEH. However 0F0H and 0FFH 
cannot be used as they are reserved for other purposes. 
The MCSU must be set to address 0. 
The Error Logger must be located immediately upstream of 
the Monitor. The nodes and SCSUs can be placed anywhere 
but it would be helpful to cluster a SCSU to every four 
nodes to reduce cabling requirements. A terminal should be 
attached to both the Error Logger and the MCSU through the 
relevant connectors. The Error Logger-MCSU connection must 
also be made. These three use the RS232 scheme, i.e. 25 
pin D type connectors with the following connections : pin 
--------------------------------------------------
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2 to pin 3, pin 3 to pin 2 and pin 7 to pin 7. 
Once installed, the next stage is to set up the Node 
Dictionary. The command "SET UP NODE DICTIONARY" must be 
issued to the terminal attached to the MCSU. An 
interactive dialog will be initiated to prompt the operator 
to enter all the configuration information (see Appendix 
2). It would be helpfui if the lavout of the entire 
installation is first done on a piece of paper before 
entering the configuration. 
C H A P T E R S E V E N 
E X P E R I M E N T A L S T U D Y 0 F 
P R 0 T 0 T Y P E 
R I N G - S T A R 
H I E R A R C H I C A L 
S Y S T E M 
7.1 Experimental Study 
T H E 
The constituent components of the Hierarchical Ring-Star 
system were continuosly tested during the entire develop-
ment period. The Error Logger, scsus, MCSU and all the 
communication protocols function correctly at this stage. 
In particular the concepts and algorithms involved were 
tested to ensure they worked in practice. 
In summary, the following major components and concepts 
were tested 
(a} Faults - to ensure all link breaks and node failures, 
either occuring singly or in multiples, 
isolated. 
are correctly 
(b) Error Logger - to ensure all errors are received and 
logged correctly and when node failures are detected, 
to send a message to the MCSU. 
(c) SCSU - to ensure that it detects and isolates link 
breaks and then informs the MCSU of their occurrences. 
It was also tested to see if it successfully executed 
-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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switching commands received from the MCSU. 
(d) MCSU - to ensure that all its functions are carried 
out correctly. 
(e) Operator controlled tasks - commands to isolate nodes, 
links and SCSUs were thoroughly tested. 
(f) Algorithms - to ensure 
correctly. 
all algorithms are executed 
(g) Communication protocols - to ensure the protocols 
deliver messages successfully. 
A brief description of the testing procedure follows: 
Being a major component of the Ring-Star, the Error Logger 
is responsible for collecting, logging and detecting ring 
faults. Testing requires the use of faulty nodes but since 
none was available, it would have to be physicallY created. 
Two problems arose from this because there were not 
enough data available on such faults it was difficult to 
create realistic conditions, and this might prove 
expensive. A better solution was to emulate a whole range 
of faults, by programming a node to transmit known error 
messages to the Error Logger. This way, the whole range of 
possible faults could be tested, and since the error types 
were known beforehand the results from the Error Logger 
could be verified. 
A standard Cambridge Ring Z80 Small Server was programmed 
to function as the Fault Message Generator. This unit was 
used as a basis for testing the Error Logger and 
subsequently to test the Ring-Star's ability to tolerate 
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node faults. 
One earl¥ Error Logger test carried out was to ensure that 
all ring errors were received and logged correctl¥ and when 
node failures were detected, to output a message to a 
terminal. Fault¥ nodes are diagnosed if' ~ number of' 
errors are detected within a time period ~. and in the 
tests, x and ¥ are variable quantities. The Fault Message 
Generator generates 
format: 
a fault message with the following 
Destination Address (DADD) 
Source Address (SADD) 
Error Flags 
0 (i.e. Error Logger address) 
= variable to simulate a range 
of' i'ault;y nodes 
= variable to simulate a range 
of ring errors 
The quantities x, ;y, SADD and Error Flags were varied. B¥ 
observing the output of' the Error Logger on the terminal 
attached, results can be evaluated. 
following settings were made : x = 
For example when the 
20, ;y lJ.0 seconds, and 
several fault messages with SADD set to 02 and error flags 
totalling more than 20 errors transmitted, the output 
d1sPlS¥ed on the terminal was "node fault detected with 
address 02." Now, when it was arranged for the messages to 
be transmitted outside the U0 seconds time limit, no such 
message was displayed. In all cases, the fault messages 
generated were logged correct!¥ in the Error Logger. 
observation can be made b¥ invoking the "Print 
This 
Error 
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Information" command. 
Other commands were similarly tested - known inputs were 
initiated and their outputs monitored. Obviously the tests 
did not proceed as smoothly as described, numerous problems 
were encountered, Most ot' these were engineering problems, 
and they were resolved as development progressed. Sut't'ice 
to sav the concepts works; an experimental study ot' the 
Hierarchical Ring-Star in its entirety will demonstrate 
that they work in practice but more significantly proves 
that the Ring-Star concept enhances reliability ot' the 
Cambridge Ring. 
------· 
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The configuration below was set up to assess the potential 
of the Hierarchical Ring-Star system. 
Error-L_.. 
SCsu-t o-IICSU 
~catL.on 
t.L.ne• 
P1 
"""'-toro 
H1 
P6 
L6 
D 
-
-ES- Loopbock ptug 
§] y...,..na~. 
F~g. 63 Conf~gurot~on of Exper~mentol system 
The plugs on the ring cable allow link breaks to be tested. 
By removing the plugs, one or more breaks in the cable can 
be affected. One plug was installed to every segment of 
the links, labelled Ll, L2, L3, L4, L5 and L6. To emulate 
node failures, the Fault Message Generator allows any type 
of ring error to be transmitted to the Error Logger bY 
entering commands and data through the terminal attached. 
The terminal connected to the EL displays error information 
as they are received. Also, error file contents may be 
displayed by entering a command. The Hierachical Ring Star 
system can be directly controlled by an operator via the 
terminal attached. 
__j 
- --------~---~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~----------------~~-
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To illustrate the Ring-Star resilience to cable breaks, 
plug Pl was removed. This immediately caused link Ll to be 
bypassed, and a message displayed on the operator's 
terminal to indicate the fault. By invoking the "Display 
Node Dictionary" command, the configuration status change 
can be seen. P2, P4, and P5 have also been tried with 
success. 
Next P3 was removed. Note that this is an edge link. 
Again the system successfully re-configurated the ring, 
this time through SCSUl., MCSU and SCSU2. 
Finally to evaluate further its effectiveness, Pl was 
removed before powering up the ring. Then when power was 
applied to bring the ring into operation, link Ll was 
automatically isolated. This ability can be very useful in 
a practical installation. In large networks, it is Quite 
possible for technicians to overlook unconnected segments 
of the links or loose connectors. The Ring-Star system 
will in these situations allow the ring to operate but 
more important, it displays the problem on the terminal 
and points to its location. 
Node failures were emulated with the help of the Fault 
Message Generator. By instructing the Fault Message 
Generator to transmit a series of fault packets with the 
source address set to Nl, the Error Logger successfully 
received and diagnosed the fault. ConseQuently, the MCSU 
isolated the node. Again a message was displayed on the 
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te~minal and the Node Dictiona~y updated. An edge node, N2 
was next t~ied. It was isolated th~ough SCSUl, MCSU and 
SCSU2 successfully. The isolation of faults was ca~~ied 
out almost instantaneously. A delay of a few seconds was 
howeve~ expe~ienced with node isolation (and when longe~ 
links we~e bypassed) due to the ~e-synch~onising p~ocess of 
the Monito~. 
The situation when two links b~oke simultaneously was also 
examined. By ~emoving Ll and L2 in quick succession, the 
system was found to ~epai~ Ll 
succession. 
and L2 in that sequence in 
By invoking the "Configu~ation Mode" f~om the main menu, 
ope~ato~ commands we~e attempted. Nodes, links, ~elay 
po~ts, and SCSUs we~e isolated f~om the ~ing. 
ca~~ied out individually and then seve~al in 
These we~e 
sequence in 
various combinations. For example, afte~ node N2 was 
bypassed, a second command to bypass link Ll was issued. 
To check if these two commands we~e executed, plug Pl and 
node N2 we~e physically ~emoved f~om the active ~ing. The 
continuing ope~ation of the ~ing confi~ms this. They we~e 
~eplaced fo~ the next test, the ~eset/~econnect commands 
we~e executed. N2 was "~econnected" into the ~ing fi~st. 
This was visually confirmed by a light emitting diode (led) 
on the node (when a ~ing ~epeate~ is active on the ~ing, 
the led lights up). Next link Ll was reconnected 
successfully. The Node Dictiona~y now displays a fully 
ope~ational ~ing. 
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7.2 Discussion 
Again the experimental tests did not always work as 
expected. Various problems did sur~ace. One o~ the most 
trying, was line matching problems between the SCSUs and 
the MCSU communication link. It was ~inallY resolved ~or 
the experimental set-up but it cannot be guaranteed ~or 
larger con~iguration. Fortunately, this is an engineering 
problem which can be resolved with care~ul installation. 
Note that this is a common problem with most communication 
circuits, usually resolved in-situ during installation. 
However, once the design ~aults had been ironed out, the 
Hierarchical Ring-Star system was shown to work. 
-----------~ ------------------------------------------------------------------------
C H A P T E R E I G H T 
E V A L U A T I 0 N 
8.1 Cabling requirements 
Appendix 1 has derived the formula to calculate cable 
len~th requirement for the Hierarchical Rin~-Star svstem 
The Mesh IL.J, Star-shaped rin~ (La), and the 
Self-Heal ring (LGH) have been included for comparison. 
Lm = 6rR where R = Radius of ring 
La = 2nR n = number of nodes 
LeH = 4nR 
LH = R[2n + 31n/80) 
The plot of cable len~th, L a~ainst the number of nodes, n 
is shown in Fi~. 64. 
Several observations can be made. The mesh and self-heal 
rin~s' length depends on the si~e of the installation 
irrespective of the number of nodes. The cabling 
requirement of the Star-Shap~d rin~ and the Hierarchical 
Rin~-star depends directlv on the number of nodes and as a 
result increases with lar~er n. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
___ I 
----------------------------------------------
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The Star-Shaped ring gives the worst results because o~ its 
single star centre. Not surprisingly, the Hierarchical 
Ring-Star shows similar results but they are much less 
pronounced. The reduction is due to the technique of 
distributing a number of star centres throughout the ring. 
For installations with up to 50 nodes, the Hierarchical 
Ring-Star is comparable to the Mesh and Sel~-Heal rings but 
deteriorates after that. 
From tt>e above anal;ysis o~ cable requirements, the 
Hierarchical Ring-Star ma;y not be acceptable ~or large 
networks. But this should not be looked at in isolation. 
First, are most installations large? Currently many 
installations do not contain more than forty nodes. 
Second, the resilient requirement must be included in the 
evaluation. Some organisations might be able to tolerate 
their network being down ~or a ~ew hours or even a ~ew 
days. Others might not. 
The environment will also affect the network. In most 
cases, one would not envisage the occurrence of several 
simultaneous ~aults. In these situations, a network which 
could tolerate single faults may be suitable. However if 
the fault is not easily accessible, it may be left 
unr-epaired. If a second ~ault then develops, the network 
will f'ail. In this case it might be better to implement a 
I 
Now 
1
1 
war, the network must be able to 
mor-e resilient network. consider a networ-k installed 
in a warship. In time of' 
-------- ..• 
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tolerate multiple simultaneous ~allures due to explosions. 
In such an application, the de~:ree o~ :resilience must be 
extremely high and the cost involved will be 1ns1gn1~1cant. 
This would apply to any applications which involve human 
lives including ~o:r example a nuclear power plant o:r a 
chemical ~actorv. 
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8.2 Cost 
The following cost estimate is made for a small quantit¥ of 
units at 1985 prices. 
Master CSU 
Components £150 
PCB £....2..Q. 
Total gQQ 
Slave csu 
Components £140 
PCB £....2..Q. 
Total £190 
Consider the experimental configuration with 16 nodes. 
This will require one Master CSU and four Slave CSUs (4 
nodes per Slave CSU), costing a total of (4x£190) + £200 = 
£960. Cost per node = £960/16 = £60. This estimate does 
not include the extra cabling cost which depends on the 
size of the network, and it does not take into account 
normal commercial 'mark-up' on these basic costs. 
8.3 Reliabilit¥ Evaluation of the S¥stem 
The. overall reliabilit¥ of the experimental Hierarchical 
Ring-Star system is evaluated and compared to the ring 
without an¥ fault tolerant enhancement. 
Reliability calculation is based on a technique called the 
----------
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m-level hierarchical clustering(MHC) [SOI 85]. This techn-
ique is especially applicable in that it decomposes the 
structure of the network into a set of multiple-level 
hierarchical clusters. Thus it lends itself naturallY to 
the hierarchical Ring-Star topology. 
The problem is to determine the reliability of a network 
comprising a number of nodes and interconnections. For the 
network to function all nodes must be connected but it 
assumes that the network has more connections than would be 
necessary if each connection is completely reliable. In 
order to determine the probability of all nodes being 
connected, we must determine the subset of network graphs 
which maintain connectivity. Alternatively we could obtain 
the subset of network graphs which do not give connection. 
Consider a simple 3-node network as an example. 
Xz 
Subset giving connection Subset not giving connection 
~ ~ y • 
x3 
L • ~ 
x3 
~ • • • • 
x3 x3 
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If we assume the nodes are reliable, and the probabilities 
of each connection being sound is p, the probability of not 
being connected is Q = (1-p), then we can proceed to 
determine the reliability. 
For the example given: 
P(x1 , "'2• x3) = p3 
P(x1 , "'2· x3) = p2q 
P(x1 , x2. x3) = p2q 
P(x1 , "'2· x3) = p2q 
Total Probability = p3 + 3p2q 
= p3 + 3P2 (1-p) 
= 3P 2 - 2p3 
The task is fairly simple for this case but it gets 
impossibly tedious for a complicated network. The MHC 
technique reduces this problem and although not completely 
accurate, it does provide a conservative answer. This 
method divides the network into clusters and then treat 
each cluster as a node with a given probability of working. 
For large networks, this process can be repeated giving a 
hierarchy of clusters. For example, the 9-node network 
below can be divided into three clusters: R1 , R2 and R3 • 
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The reliabilitv of each of the networks inside the cluster 
can be determined as before i.e. 
The reliabilitv of the whole network, R is then given bV 
R1R 2R3 times the reliabilitv of the network using 
clusters as nodes, 
i.e. 
The kev issue is how the nodes should be clustered. The 
clustering technique is generallv defined as one of finding 
natural groupings of a set 
separate issues: 
of nodes. This involves two 
(i) the similaritv (or nearness) between two nodes 
(ii) how to partition a set of nodes into clusters 
As overall reliabilitv decreases with an increase in the 
diameter of the network (SOI 85), it is obvious that 
clusters should be chosen to correspond to highlV connected 
sets o~ nodes, which result in a small diameter. Further, 
since reliabilitv evaluation is now dependent on spanning 
trees internal to the cluster, the cluster must contain the 
shortest paths between its nodes. 
-- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-- -- --- ----------------~-----~, 
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The Hie:t>archical Ring-Sta:t> fits natu:t>ally into the above 
two c:t>ite:t>ia since its topology has itself been designed to 
form clusters. Nodes within clusters are chosen to 
minimize distances between them and each node-to-SCSU 
cluster is highly connected. Thus each SCSU forms a 
natural cluster with the nodes connected into them. 
Levels of clusters must be fo:t>med. Basically, an m-level 
hierarchical clustering of a set of nodes 
grouping the nodes into l.st level clusters, 
are grouped into 2nd level clusters, etc. 
consists of 
which in turn 
This operation 
continues in a bottom-up fashion, finally grouping the 
m-2nd level clusters into m-l.st level clusters, whose union 
constitutes the mth level cluster. 
is the highest level cluster and as 
the nodes of the networK. 
The mth level cluste:t> 
such it includes all 
8.3.1 Numerical evaluation of the system 
The 16 nodes 2-level Hierarchical Ring-Star is clustered 
into foul? levels as shown in Fig. 6U for the evaluation. 
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F~g. 64 
Assume all links have the same reliability p, and 
unreliability q, all nodes have the same reliability n, all 
SCSUs have the same reliability s, and the MCSU has a 
reliability of m. These assumptions are made for the sake 
of mathematical simplicity. 
Step 1: evaluate the reliability of the lst level cluster. 
The spannin~ trees are XlX2, XlX3, and X2X3. 
Reliability (links only) = Pr{X1X2 U XlX3 U X2X3} 
= p'" + 2p2(1-p) 
Overall Reliability, R1.1 • n.n.s(3p2 - 2p'") 
a n2s(3p2 - 2p3 ) ...........• (1) 
--~-----------------------------------------------------------------
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XI 
node 0-----10 node 
R :1. • 2 = n 2 p ................................. ( 1 1 ) 
Step 2: evaluate the reliability of the 2nd level cluster. 
Each second level cluster is really two nodes with reliabi-
lity, and interconnected by 3 links in 
parallel. 
R2 = R1.1[l - (1-p) 3 ]R1·2 
= [(3p2 -2p3 }n2 s][n2 p][3p- 3p2 + p3) 
= n 4 s[9p4 - 15po + 9p•- 2p7J ...••.•.•••• (iii) 
Step 3: evaluate the reliability of the 3rd level cluster. 
Jrd Level. 
'<h Level. 
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R2 This structue is similar to (i) 
except that the SCSU is replaced 
with a MCSU. 
Thus, 
R:s-• = {3p 2 -. 2p"")n 2 m ••.•••.•.•••.• (iv) 
0 0 
R2 R2 This structure is similar to (ii) 
R:s- 2: = R:aR2p •••••••••••••••••••••••• (V) 
Step ~: evaluate the reliabilitY of the Uth level cluster. 
R
3
,, and R3 , 2 are interconnected bY four links in parallel. 
Substituting (iii), (iv), and (v) into (vi), the reliabili-
ty of the 16 nodes 2-Level Hierarchical Ring-Star system is, 
where, 
With off-line redundancy, the value of R is improved 
further by approximatelY 23% 
Not enough data is available to enumerate values for p,m,n 
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and s in the Cambridge Ring environment. Instead, a range 
of possible values is substituted to evaluate the 
reliabilitv of the experimental Hierarchical Ring-Star 
s:,rstem (HRS). The results are depicted in Table 2. The 
reliabilitv of the HRS with and without off-line redundancv 
is evaluated. For comparison, 
fault tolerance is included. 
the same ring without any 
In this case the ring is 
simpl:,r a serial network with reliability p• 6 n 16• The 
improvement factor (R2/R3) 
Table 2. 
is computed and presented in 
The evaluation shows that with less reliable components, 
the overall reliabilitY of the Hierarchical Ring-Star is 
low. As component reliabilit:,r improves, the incremental 
improvement in reliability of the Hierarchical Ring-Star is 
higher till thev are egual at unity. 
with the improvement factor R2/R3. 
The opposite is true 
It goes lower as 
component reliability improves. This is obvious since with 
100% reliable parts, a machine must in whole be 100% 
reliable. Thus the Hierarchical Ring-Star is most 
effective when ring nodes and/or links are less reliable. 
But in practice, this may be questionable. At realistic 
values of node and link reliability (0.98 or above), the 
reliability improvement with the Hierarchical Ring-Star is 
not too significant at approximately 50% better. However 
the most important consideration is the overall 
reliability. In this esse, it approaches 90%. 
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R1 R2 RJ R2 
~ .rr-lt.at -.u. .rr-t.w~t 
-----
--p • n • 
- -
, ... ......._ R3 
O.'lO O.'lO O.'lO O.'lO 0.11 0.21 0.03 1.00 
0.~1 O.'lO 0.~3 o.q1 o.:zs 0.31 0.01 4.40 
o.~ o.q1 O.qJ o.~ 0.21 0.34 0.08 4.25 
O.qJ O.qJ 0.'!5 o.~ 0.36 0.45 0.14 3.2 
o.q, o.~ 0.'!5 o.~ 0.38 0.46 0.16 2.88 
0.'!5 0.'!5 0.'!5 0.'!5 0.43 0.53 0.1q 2.1q 
0.'!5 o.qJ o.qs O.qJ 0.45 0.55 0.23 2.3q 
o.qs o.q3 o.q1 o.~ 0.51 0.62 0.32 1.q4 
o.qs o.~ o.q1 o.q4 0.52 0.64 0.32 2.00 
o.q1 0.~ o.q1 0.'!5 0.55 0.68 0.38 1.1q 
o.q1 o.qs o.qs 0.'!5 0.64 0.1~ 0.44 1.8 
o.qs o.q3 o.qs 0.'!5 0.64 0.1~ 0.52 1.52 
o.qs o.q4 o.qs o.qs o.ss 0.82 0.52 1.58 
o.qq o.qs o.qs o.~ 0.12 0.88 0.62 1.42 
o.qq o.qq o.qq o.qq o.ss 1.0511 .. e. 1! 0.12 1.Jq 
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.23(1.-8. 1! 1.00 1.00 
TABLE 2 
---- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------, 
C H A P T E R N I N E 
D I S C U S S I 0 N, C 0 N C L U S I 0 N A N D 
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9.1 General Comments 
The Ring-Star concept has been developed to enhance the 
Cambridge Ring with fault tolerance, and experiments have 
demonstrated its effectiveness. However it must be 
pointed out that the Ring-Star deals onl¥ with the 
communication channel. In this sense although the Monitor 
is an integral unit of the Cambridge Ring it has not been 
considered. Thus faulty nodes and broken ring cables 
should not disrupt ring operation but an imperfect Monitor 
will. 
One solution is to apply fault tolerant techniques such as 
Standb¥ Replacement or Triple Modular Redundanc¥ 
(described in chapter 2) to the Monitor. These techniques 
are expensive and bearing in mind the Monitor itself is 
reliable, their use should be cost justified. 
area for further experimentation. 
This is an 
This single point failure problem extends to the CSU (SCSU 
and MCSU) and the Error Logger. Once the S¥stem has been 
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brought into operation to 'heal' a ring fault, reliabilit¥ 
is determined by the probability that the CSU and to a 
lesser degree the Error Logger fails within the time period 
required to rectify the fault. However, since normally 
this may take only a few minutes (e.g. replacing the faulty 
node with another while it is being repaired), high 
time. reliability can be achieved over long periods of 
Dependence on the CSU is not as catastrophic as was first 
thought. Using off-line redundancy, the CSU does not even 
play a part in normal operation. Similarly, the Error 
Logger is not absolutely crucial. Instead of totall¥ 
rel¥ing on the Error Logger to detect all ring faults as 
was originally envisaged, it is now only responsible for 
detecting node faults. The task of link break detection 
has been delegated to the SCSUs. 
The same point must also be made about the Name Server and 
the Boot Server. Although strictly not required in the 
operation of the Cambridge Ring, their use has been built 
into most protocols. For example, the Single Shot Protocol 
requires a device to obtain from the Name Server the ring 
address of the device it wishes to communicate with before 
proceeding to establish a link. Therefore a totally secure 
Cambridge Ring system requires a fault tolerant Name Server 
and a Boot Server too. Fault tolerant network servers are 
another potential area for further work. 
Several general points 
Ring-Star: 
can be made of the Hierarchical 
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(a) Distributed fault detection 
Critics might argue that the Hierarchical Ring-Star is 
based on a single MCSU, Although central to its 
operation in that the MCSU stores all the configuration 
information and allows an operator to control its 
topology, its primary role is different. It is only 
directly responsible for controlling node failures. 
Link breaks which are probably the more likely of the 
two faults are controlled by SCSUs. 
edge cases. 
(b) Enforces record keeping 
The exception is 
In any installation, keeping documentaton up to date 
may present a problem. Personnel in charge may adopt a 
blase attitude, resulting in an inaccurately kept 
record. Future maintenance or expansion may as a result 
be difficult. With the Ring-Star concept, control is 
enforced since the Node Dictionary must be set up 
during installation. (This is then dynamically 
maintained.) Since the Node Dictionary is a "road map" 
of the network, 
always available. 
(c) Performance 
configuration information is then 
Peformance of the Cambridge Ring will alter as nodes or 
links are bypassed. The reason is that slot structure 
may change due to changes in the ring delay. As a 
result the number of minipackets in circulation may 
increase or decrease. It has been shown that this 
affects ring peformance (Blair 83). 
(d) Network size 
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The maximum inter-node cable length will be reduced 
compared to a basic ring because the signal path must 
divert into the csu. This is a consequence of the star 
structure. 
9.2 Independent of Technology 
The Hierarchical Ring-Star has been designed for wide 
applications. Because of the way it has been designed 
(based on topology), it can easily be adapted for use with 
any other type of ring technology. Thus token rings, 
register-insertion rings or any other future proprietary 
rings may take advantage of the methodology presented in 
this thesis. 
Similarly, data transmission speed is irrelevant. It makes 
no difference to the Hierarchical Ring-Star if the speed is 
lK baud or 100M baud. However the higher speeds may 
necessitate the use of optical fibre as the transmission 
medium. In this case, the mechanical relays in the CSUs 
should be replaced by their fibre optic equivalent. 
9.3 Conclusions 
This thesis has presented a unique technique to overcome 
the potential reliability problems of the Cambridge Ring. 
The Ring-Star concept in the form of the Hierarchical 
Ring-Star is proposed as a fault tolerant enhancement for 
the Cambridge Ring. Experiments have shown that it works. 
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9,3 Conclusions 
This thesis has presented a unique technique to overcome 
the potential reliability problems o~ the Cambridge Ring. 
The Ring-Star concept in the ~orm o~ the Hierarchical 
Ring-Star is proposed as a ~ault tolerant enhancement ~or 
the Cambridge Ring. Experiments have shown that it works. 
In the early stages o~ the project, a literature review was 
initiated to carry out a detailed study o~ ~ault tolerant 
rings, with the aim o~ identi~ying key design issues. 
They were analysed, and taking into account the Cambridge 
Ring technology, a set o~ objectives was produced. The 
Hierarchical Ring-Star system has been developed to meet 
these objectives. How have these objectives been achieved? 
Realising that ring networks have a weak structure, the 
~irst phase o~ the work ~ocussed on the topology. The idea 
o~ the Ring-Star arose because it was realised that rings 
and star topologies each have unique strengths which 
complemented one another. Rings were invented ~or their 
per~ormance improvements in data communication but at the 
expense o~ topological reliability. Star topology on the 
other hand has a stong structure in that any device 
connected into it may ~ail without any consequence to the 
rest o~ the network. Combining the two topologies creates 
a network which is both e~~icient and reliable. 
This topology and the ensuing design satis~ies the 
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objectives. First and foremost, node and link breaks would 
not bring down the entire network, as only the affected 
sections are isolated. Dynamic reconfiguration ensures 
this. Second, it has a high degree of resilience in that 
multiple faults are tolerated and thirdly, fragmentation 
of the network is minimised. This in fact is the key 
factor in favour of the Ring-Star, many of the other fault 
tolerant rings can only tolerate one fault. A second fault 
will either bring down the network or cause the network to 
be divided into two isolated segments. The objective of 
operational independence between the fault tolerant 
component and the ring was however not totally achieved. 
To ensure the effective detection of broken cables, a 
modification had to be made to the repeater. This is 
necessary because the Cambridge Ring was found 
effective in detecting link breaks. 
to be less 
Installing the system into an existing Cambridge Ring is 
relatively easy. It is a matter of redirecting the 
node-to-ring cable from the ring into the SCSU and 
connecting a cable from the SCSU into the ring. 
installed, future expansion is relatively easy. 
And once 
The system supports maintenance in two ways. First, it 
provides diagnostic information through the Node 
Dictionary. The Node Dictionary stores and updates network 
configuration details as changes take place. For example 
if a node should fail, its location is recorded so that a 
technician can easily find the faulty node instead of 
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havin~ to trace through the ring ~or it. Second, once 
located, the node can simpl¥ be removed without having to 
worr¥ about its e~fect on the ring. It is this latter 
~eature that makes expansion eas¥. The section o~ the ring 
to be extended is ~irst isolated, new nodes are then added 
be~ore a command is issued to the MCSU to bring them into 
operation. 
This convenience extends to users. Whenever 
recon~iguration o~ the network is carried out, users would 
onl¥ experience a delay o~ a few seconds. Compare this to 
a basic ring which requires the network to be taken out o~ 
service, and the ~ault recti~ied be~ore normal service can 
be restored. This ma¥ take In short. the 
Hierarchical Ring-Star allows almost non-stop operation. 
Finall¥, b¥ keeping the fault tolerant component o~ the 
S¥Stem independent ~rom network technolog¥, it is better 
protected ~rom obsolescence arising ~rom ~uture 
developments. 
Ring-Star is 
For the same reason, the Hierarchical 
not limited to the Cambridge Ring. It can 
easily be adapted ~or any other ring. 
By adopting the Hierarchical Ring-Star, the Cambridge Ring 
could resolve its greatest disadvantage topological 
unreliabilit¥. In ~act anY potential network implementor 
should consider reliabilit¥ problems seriously. The impact 
may not be ~elt until it is too late. Perhaps the 
following quotation best sums it up: 
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"For manv applications fault tolerance is no longer 
regarded as a bonus- it is essential." 
- Rob Summerfield 
Minicomputer News Vol 8 no 10 October 1985 
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A P P E N D I X 1 
To derive formulae for cable length calculations 
The following formulae were developed for comparing the 
Mesh, Self-Heal, Star-Shaped ring and the Hierarchical 
Ring-Star topologies in their cabling requirement. 
The lavout of anv installation will depend on the total 
number of nodes, their spread and in particular the 
architecture of the building or site. This obviouslv 
varies greatlv. Thus an accurate comparision of the four 
topologies is impossible, and to make anv comparisons at 
all, somewhat unrealistic assumptions have to be made. 
The following are the main assumptions made: 
- a ring is installed in a circle with radius R and 
diameter D. 
- the topologv models the ideal structure of 
each design. 
n = total number of nodes 
L total length of cable required 
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Mesh Network 
Various configurations of the Mesh is possible but for the 
comparison, one where alternate nodes are linked with an 
extra cable is modelled. From Fig. Al, it can be observed 
that such a topology is reallY three rings connected in 
parallel. 
Thus, L = 3 X 2rrR 
3 1"\.ng 
coi>I.H 
= 6rrR 
F~g. A1 The Hash ne~work ~s really 3 r~ngs ~n parallel 
Self-Heal Ring 
Since it is a double loop, 
L = 2 x 2rrR 
= llrrR 
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Star-Shaped Ring 
This ring is shaped into a star structure with a pair o~ 
cables connecting up each node. Each cable pair is 
equivalent to length 2R. 
L = n X 2R 
= 2nR 
Hierarchical Ring-Star 
It is likel¥ that in the ~uture, the most common network 
would wire up a building. Thus, a 3-level Hierarchical 
Ring-Star network will be modelled, with a rigid structure 
t'or simplicit¥. 
--- -~~~:I 
01, 
0!:50 
F~g. AZ A 3-~eve~ H~erorch~col R~ng-Stor Structure 
It is further assumed that the distance between CSUs {MCSU 
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and SCSUs) are spaced equall~. thus D/4. Relative to this 
distance, the length o~ cable connecting a node to the SCSU 
is small. Assuming a building with an average length of 
50m, a node-to-SCSU cable o~ length 1m will give D/50. 
Also, each SCSU is assumed to have 4 rela~ ports and there 
are a multiple of 4 nodes in the network. 
Let P be the total number of level 2 CSU 
Let Q be the total number of level 1 CSU 
P = n/4 and Q = P/4 = n/16 
L = circumference of ring + MCSU-to-level 1 CSU links + level 
1 CSU-to-level 2 CSU links + level 2 CSU-to-node links 
= 2TIR + (2XD/4) + (2x23DY/100) + (2Dn/50) 
D = 2R 
L = 2TIR + (2x2Rn/16) + (2x23x2Rxn/1600) + (4Rn/50) 
= 2TIR + Rn/4 + 23Rn/400 + 2Rn/25 
2TIR + 155Rn/400 
L = R(2TI + 3ln/80) 
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A Guide for Operating the Hierarchical Ring-Star S;ystem 
When the MCSU is first switched on, onl¥ the prompt ">" 
will be displayed. This indicates where commands are t;yped 
in. In fact there is onl¥ one command, Control-A (hoid 
down the CTRL ke;y and press the "A" ke;y) to get into the 
Master Menu. From here onwards, the user will be prompted 
to enter data or commands selected from menus. If a 
character is t;yped wrongl;y, it can be deleted b¥ using the 
"BACKSPACE" or the "RIGHT CURSOR" ke;y. The operation will 
be explained b;y going through the contents of the Master 
Menu and sub-menus step b¥ step. 
B;y entering Control-A, the Master Menu shown below will be 
displa;yed. 
MENU: 
ENTER CONFIGURATION MODE 1 
SET UP NODE DICTIONARY 2 
DISPLAY NODE DICTIONARY 3 
EXIT 6 
What do vou want to do? 
Choice = _ 
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If the choice = 1, the next menu is displayed. Note : in 
all cases, a Carriage Return must be typed to enter the 
command. 
CONFIGURATION MODE 
Enter command for task required 
Task Bvpass Reset 
Node 121 A 
Link 1 B 
Relav Port 2 c 
scsu 3 D 
Displav EL X 
Enable EL y 
Exit E 
Choice 
From here, to assist with the explanation the format below 
will be adopted. The contents of the screen displav 
(roughl¥) are shown on the left with comments on the right. 
Displav 
Choice = 0 
Node Address = 
Response (Done, 
Failed or Address 
does not exist 
Choice = 1 
Address of Node to 
to which Link is 
connected into = 
Response (Done, 
Failed or Address 
does not exist 
Choice = 2 
SCSU Address = 
Port no. = 
Response (Done, 
Failed or Address 
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Comments 
Node B¥paas command selected. 
Enter node address (to be isolated 
from ring) in 2 characters e.g. lA, 
05, F2. Hexadecimal notation assumed. 
The svstem will response in one of 3 
ways. If the command is carried out 
successfull¥, 'Done' is displaved, 
otherwise, 'Failed'. If the address 
cannot be found in the Node Dictionarv 
the third response is made. 
Link Bvpass command selected. 
As above 
As above 
As above 
Relav Port Bvpass command selected. 
Address of the SCSU on which Rela¥ 
Port is contained. 
The specific Relav Port on the SCSU 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
does not exist 
Choice = 3 
SCSU Address = 
Response (Done, 
Failed or Address 
does not exist 
Choice = X 
Response (Done 
or Failed) 
Choice = Y 
Response (Done 
or Failed) 
Choice 
> 
E 
Choice = A 
Node Address = 
Response (Done, 
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As above 
SCSU Bvpass command selected. 
Address of the SCSU. 
As above 
Disable Error Logger command selected. 
Enable Error Logger command selected, 
Exit command selected. 
Prompt indicating exit from 
Configuration Mode. 
Node Reset command selected. 
As in choice = 0 
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Failed or Address 
does not exist 
Choice = B Link Reset command selected. 
Address of Node to 
to which Link is 
connected into = As in choice = 1 
Response (Done, 
Failed or Address 
does not exist 
' 
Choice = C Relay Port Reset command selected. 
SCSU Address = As in choice = 2 
Port no. = 
Response (Done, 
Failed or Address 
does not exist 
Choice = D SCSU Reset command selected. 
SCSU Address = As in choice = 3 
Response (Done, 
Failed or Address 
does not exist 
The "Disable EL" command can be used by an operator to 
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reconfigure the network without causing 'false' error 
detection. Recall that relay actions will cause artificial 
ring breaks. Thus this command should be used before 
carrving out reconfiguration and t-eset b¥ the "Enable EL" 
command after. 
If choice = 2 is selected from the Master Menu. the "SET UP 
NODE DICTIONARY" MODE is entet-ed. This is normall¥ the 
first task required when the svstem is first installed. 
Addressing information is entered into the Node Dictionarv. 
In essense, the svstem prompts the operator (or network 
administrator) to enter addresses of devices connected into 
the Relav Ports. In the case of the SCSU, the actual 
nodes' ring addresses are entered. For the MCSU, the 
addresses of SCSUs are entered. 
NOTE: If anv RP does not have a device attached, 
must be entered. 
an 'N' 
Display 
How manv levels of CSU 
are there in the Network 
Configuration'? 
No. of levels = 
Enter Address of Slave CSU 
attached to Relay Port 1 
Comments 
In this case, enter 02 for 
a 2-level architecture. 
The first of 8 Relav Ports 
on the MCSU. Enter a 2 
Slave CSU Address = 
Enter Network Address of Node 
attached to Relay Port 1 
Network address = _ 
Enter Network Address of Node 
attached to Relay Port 2 
Network address = 
Enter Network Address of Node 
attached to Relay Port 3 
Network address = 
Enter Network Address of Node 
attached to Relay Port 4 
Network address = 
Enter Address of Slave CSU 
attached to Relay Port 2 
Slave CSU Address = 
Enter Network Address of Node 
attached to Relay Port 1 
Network address = _ 
Enter Network Address of Node 
attached to Relay Port 2 
Network address • 
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character response as before. 
This is similar to the above 
but for Relay Port 1 on 
SCSU1. 
As above but for RP 2 
As above but for RP 3 
As above but for RP 4 
The second of 8 Relay Ports 
on the MCSU. 
Relay Port 1 on the SCSU 
above. 
As above but for RP 2 
Enter Network Address of Node 
attached to Relay Port 3 
Network address = 
Enter Network Address of Node 
attached to Relav Port 4 
Network address = 
Enter Address of Slave CSU 
attached to Relav Port 3 
Slave CSU Address = 
etc 
Enter Address of Slave CSU 
attached to Relav Port 8 
Slave CSU Address = 
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As above but for RP 3 
As above but for RP 4 
The third of 8 Relav Ports 
on the MCSU. 
The last of 8 Relay Ports 
on the MCSU. 
If choice 3 is selected from the Master Menu, the 
"DISPLAY NODE DICTIONARY'' MODE is entered. This simplv 
prints out the contents (address and status) of the Node 
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Dictionarv. A sample screen is shown. 
Format is : 
nth Level 1 Slave CSU Address = Status 
CSU Port = Node Address : Status 
1 = 02H : ENTRY, 
A 00H EMPTY 
B = 22H ENTRY, Node ok, Link ok 
c = B3H ENTRY, Node ok, Link broken, Link bvpassed 
D = 24H ENTRY, Node ok, Link ok 
2 = 00H : EMPTY, 
A = 00H EMPTY, 
B = 00H EMPTY, 
c = 00H EMPTY, 
D = 00H EMPTY, 
3 = 09H : ENTRY, 
A = 14H ENTRY, Node ok, Link ok, Link bvpassed 
B = F3H ENTRY, Node t'aultv, Node b,ypassed, Link ok 
c = 43H ENTRY, Node ok, Link ok, Link bvpassed 
D 04H ENTRY, Node ok, Link ok 
4 05H : ENTRY, scsu bvpassed 
A 00H EMPTY 
B = 22H ENTRY, Node ok, Link ok 
c = B3H ENTRY, Node ok, Link ok 
D = 24H ENTRY, Node ok, Link ok 
8 = 00H EMPTY, 
A = 00H EMPTY, 
B = 00H EMPTY, 
C = 00H EMPTY, 
D 00H EMPTY, 
Notes 
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The status for the SCSU Relay Ports can be combinations of: 
Node ok, Link ok, Node fault;y, Link broken, Node/Rela;y 
Port b;ypassed, or Link b;ypassed. 
When a Node or Rela;y Port is b;ypassed, the links on the 
Rela;y Ports on either side of the Rela;y port are b;ypassed 
too. 
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Circuit diagram of the Master CSU 
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Circuit diagram of the Slave csu 
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Hierarchical Ring-Star Interconnection Scheme 
and 
Cabling Details 
J 
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Interconnection Scheme and Cabling 
The interconnection scheme between the ring, repeater, SCSU 
and MCSU is shown below. 
( 
RING --------••• , 
--Fl-· -· -··------·-·---···----------······-·· ,! 
SCSI.H~I'EA TER CABI.£ 
r-1-++-+-+-+,--r-· ~---· ------·, 
to 
n,ng 
F~g. AS 
to llruaed Relou Port 1 
repe<Xflr' scsu i 
-----------.J 
Hou the H~erorch~coL 
R~ng-Star ~s 
connected together HCSU '----------·--------
The various cables must be made up as shown in Fig. A5.1. 
The cables marked 'Ring Cables' must con~orm to the CR82 
standard. The other cables can be an¥ twisted pair 
telephone cables. 
- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------~ 
TO SCSU 
I· ~ J 10 , 5 1211 2 8 15 ~ " 1 
'r--
'r--
';-.. 1'-
..... 
I· q J 10' 5 12 2 11 s IS 6 "' 
TO tCSU 
MCSU-SCSU CABLE 
15 PIN 0 
TYPE Pl.UI; 
15 PIN 0 
TYPE SOO<E:T 
15 PIN 
TYPE PL 
Rinll: Cable 
TO !IEPE<TER 
Apoerld1x 5 200 
TO r:uNG 
[ I q 3 10 8156141 I I I I I I I 
0 
Ul; 
I _...v V v 
s 
ltqJ10 
TO SCSI! 
SCSU-RING CABLE 
StSGI41 
15 PIH 0 
TYPE SOO<E:T 
llqJIO 61SG141 
15 PIN 0 
TYPE SOO<E: 
Ring: Cables 
T 
I--
/ 
/ 
/ 
llqJIO 2 5 6156141 
TO SCSI! 15 PIN 0 
TYPE PlUI; 
SCSU-REPEATER CABLE 
Fill:· A5.1 

